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Recent Supreme Court decisions' have caused havoc in the Biotechnology and
Software industries in the U.S. by vastly increasing the number of U.S. patents being
invalidated based on the patent eligible subject matter requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§101. As a result, the spotlight on 35 U.S.C. §101 is increasing and there are
discussions amongst the patent bar for how best to address the unintended
consequences. I here argue that Congress should abolish the Supreme Courtpromulgated, non-statutory exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101, in toto, because they: 1)
run directly in conflict with the express statutory language of 35 U.S.C. §101 and its
Congressional intent; 2) have been extremely difficult to implement in practice by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the District courts and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit; 3) offer no significant benefit that outweighs the havoc and harm
caused to public and private innovation-driven industries; 4) run in direct contrast to
the laws of other industrialized nations on this narrow legal issue; and 5) otherwise
greatly discourage current and future innovators from developing and
commercializing their new discoveries and technologies in America.

Mayo Collaborative Sers. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S.
208 (2014).

2019]

To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish
The Supreme Court Created Exceptions to 35 U.S. Code §101

3

Mark Twain once commented "A country without a patent office and good
2
patent laws was just a crab, and couldn't travel any way but sideways or backwards."
I. Introduction
The Patent Act, under 35 U.S.C. §101, defines and specifies four independent
categories of subject matter of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for patent
protection: 1) processes; 2) machines; 3) manufactures; and 4) compositions of
matter. 3 While it is clear from the 35 U.S.C. §101 statute that Congress intended to
4
give a wide scope to patent eligible subject matter, the Supreme Court has judicially
created three exceptions to this statutory languages and recently has gone further to
6
greatly expand the scope of these exceptions. This has dramatically narrowed the
scope of patent protection available to innovation-driven private and public
enterprises, especially affecting stakeholders in the Biotechnology and Softwaredriven industries.7
Three recent Supreme Court decisions8 have greatly disrupted new technologydriven industries, including the biopharmaceutical and software engineering
industries, by vastly increasing the number of software and biological patents being
invalidated based on 35 U.S.C. §101. Even though the Supreme Court advised the
lower courts to "thread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it
swallow all of patent law," 9 the lower courts and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have used these Supreme Court decisions to strike down and invalidate
hundreds of U.S. patents.1 0 Moreover, thousands of pending patent applications are
2

3

MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 107 (1889). This quote illustrates

my opinion that unless legislative action is taken in 2020 to correct our patent eligibility laws, the
U.S. may be set to travel sideways or backwards on the innovation road for some time.
The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), states: "Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."

4

Id.

5

"We have 'long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable."' Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad

Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (citing Mayo, 132 S.Ct., at 1293).

7

See Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo and Myriad and the
Evisceration of Patent EligibilityforMolecularDiagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. REv. 495, 531
(2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court expanded the judicial exceptions to patentable subject matter
in Mayo and Myriad).
See, e.g., id. (arguing that the expansions "endanger patentability for molecular diagnostics").

8

Mayo, 566 U.S. 66 ; Myriad, 569 U.S. 576 ; Alice, 573 U.S. 208.

6

9 Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
10

See, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that device profile described in patent was not patent eligible, and that method claims in

patent did not describe patent eligible subject matter); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed.
App'x. 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that method and system claims failed to transform the abstract
idea of managing a game of bingo into a patent-eligible invention); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims at issue were directed to abstract ideas, and thus

4
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failing to overcome the new hurdle that patent applicants are subject to under 35
U.S.C. §101 and are thus becoming abandoned."
All patent stakeholders have been affected by this seesaw change in patent
eligibility laws, including inventors, patent office examiners, patent owners, patent
lawyers and judges alike. It is becoming increasingly accepted by this community
that as a result of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence bringing profound
uncertainty to the nation's patent eligibility laws, enormous negative consequences
have been felt by American businesses across the nation and especially so in
Biotechnology and Software-driven enterprises. Thus, the unintended consequences
of these Supreme Court decisions are increasingly giving rise to a discussion amongst
the patent bar for options available for addressing the situation we face today.
Accordingly, one currently pressing question in patent law is what can be done
to tilt back the balance and help the innovators in America? I here argue that Congress
should abolish the non-statutory exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101 for being against
current and future thinkers and entrepreneurial innovators who aim to develop and
commercialize tomorrow's new technologies in America. That is, I propose the
exceptions that the Supreme Court has created to statutorily defined patent eligible
subject matter are creating great uncertainty in the innovation ecosystem and harming
new technology development and commercialization in America.
By tracing the roots of the legislative history of the patent eligibility statute (35
U.S.C. §101) to the present day, analyzing the express statutory language and
historical as well as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue, I aim to
convince the reader that the Supreme Court was misguided when it recently greatly
expanded the scope of their own exceptions to the statutorily defined patent eligible
subject matter. These exceptions to what subject matter is patent eligible under the
35 U.S.C. § 101 statute have greatly narrowed the scope of patent protection available
to innovation-driven private and public enterprises
Nowadays, private and public enterprises see the prospect of protecting their
new and future innovations in certain fields, including in Biotechnology and
Software-driven fields, as a mountain not worth climbing under the current patent
eligibility laws in America. As a result, as discussed infra, there has been a huge

were invalid as unpatentable); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that claims describing a method for distributing media products directed to abstract ideas,

and thus were invalid as unpatentable); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test
Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims for particular diagnostic methods
to identify mutations in DNA sequences did not render patentable otherwise ineligible abstract
mental process method claims); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l

Assoc., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the patent claims related to processing information
were directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas).

Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 354, 35859 (2016) (finding that in the two years post Alice, the patent office had rejected over 36,000
published patent applications under Alice, and over 5,000 of such applications becoming
abandoned.)
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downturn in research and development at many of the largest biopharmaceutical and
software companies, as well as in hospitals and public research-driven enterprises,
across the nation. This has in turn had the effect of killing off the prospects of
innovative companies, including new Biotechnology and Software startup
companies, bringing new innovations in medicine, software, artificial intelligence and
the like to the marketplace. Weary of the current laws concerning patent eligibility,
2
companies and their investors, as discussed infra on investment in new technology,
are seeing broken patent eligibility laws incapable of supporting investment and new
technology development. 3
These entrepreneurial technology innovators and their investors are, to borrow
a phrase from Mark Twain, seeing a country that in 2019 is traveling sideways or
backwards.' 4 To perhaps give perspective by way of an example, a brand new medical
technology related to non-invasively detecting abnormalities in a fetus during
pregnancy, discussed further infra, was found to be patent eligible subject matter by
both the highest court of the United Kingdom in November of 2017,5 and also by the
Federal Court of Australia in August of 2019,16 yet that same technology and subject
matter remains patent ineligible under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.1 7 Thus,
if our patent eligibility laws do not change in the U.S., investors and innovative
technology entrepreneurs will pivot towards other jurisdictions in well-developed
industrialized countries that compete for talent with the U.S.
I here present my thesis that American society stands to benefit from abolishing
the non-statutory, Supreme Court promulgated, exceptions to U.S. Code Section 101
altogether. Parts I and II of this article explore the express language of the statute, 35
U.S.C. §101, and its legislative history; and the historical to present day Supreme
Court jurisprudence on 35 U.S.C. §101. Parts III and IV draw on the Supreme Court's
recently adopted framework for assessing patent eligible subject matter and examine
how it has been applied and the reasons why it has created such profound uncertainty
in patent laws, and how this has ultimately damaged America's standing as a leader
in new technology development and commercialization.
Part V concludes by advocating that abolishing the non-statutory, Supreme
Court-created, exceptions to patent eligibility laws will a) modernize and simplify the
rules governing U.S. patent laws; b) will harmonize this feature of U.S. patent law
with the patent laws of other industrialized societies, much akin to how Congress
2 Jason Rantanen, Guest Post on Patent Eligibility and Investment: A Survey, PATENTLYO (Oct. 16,
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/patent-eligibility-investment.html
PM)
4:41
2019,
[https://perma.cc/P3W3-X4TU].

3

Id.

14

TWAIN, supra note 2 ("A country without a patent office and good patent laws was just a crab and
couldn't travel any way but sideways or backwards.").

15

Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health PLC [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2930, (Eng.).

16 Sequenom, Inc. V. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. [2019] FCA 101 1, (Austl.).
11

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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harmonized important other aspects of U.S. patent laws with patent laws of other
industrialized countries when it passed the monumental America Invents Act in 2012;
and c) will once again lower the threshold hurdle on patent eligible subject matter and
instead rely on other developed and working statutory patentability provisions of the
Patent Act to achieve the same goals of not allowing patent protection on standalone
mathematical formula, abstract thoughts, and the like.
There is a growing movement advocating that it is now time for Congress to act
to fix the untenable situation regarding patent eligibility laws. Proposals have ranged
from keeping the exceptions the Supreme Court has created to the statute and having
a "practical application" test as skillfully proposed by other Intellectual Property law
professors 8 to wholesale repealing of the entire 35 U.S.C. §101 statute from the
Patent Act as advocated by David Kappos, the Director of the US Patent and
Trademark Office from 2009-2013.19 In this paper, I advocate not for the wholesale
repealing of the statute, but also not for more tinkering to keep in line with the
Supreme Court's exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. §101, and
discussing how lower courts, practitioners and the patent office ought to apply it.
Instead, I argue for keeping the long-standing statute, but removing the three
exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. §101 that the Supreme Court has
unilaterally fashioned and has brazenly vastly expanded in scope recently. Viewing
the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. §101, discussed infra, it is abundantly clear that
the Supreme Court-created exceptions to this statute, especially the recent cases that
hugely expand the scope of these judicially-created exceptions, run in direct conflict
with not only the express language of the statute itself but also to what Congress has
purposefully intended for over 200 years and during the passage of tens of Patent
Acts.
Supreme Court's recent activism on this issue, which ironically the Court itself
warned had the power to "swallow all of patent law" 20 and "eviscerate patent law," 21
and the resulting mayhem it has now caused, has greatly harmed the innovation
ecosystem in America. There is a growing chorus within the patent bar that the time
is ripe for Congress to take some kind of action.
Should Congress abolish the non-statutory exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101,
18 Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom Inc. 788 F.3d 1371.
LAW REVIEw (Oct.
16, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kappos-calls-abolition-section-

19 Steven Lundberg, Dave Kappos Callsfor Abolition of Section 101, THE NAT'L.
101.
20
21

The Supreme Court advised the lower courts in Alice to "tread carefully in construing this
exclusionaryprinciple lest it swallow all ofpatentlaw." (emphasis added). Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354.
Two years prior to Alice, the Supreme Court in Mayo warned that their own judicially created
exceptions to the statute have the power to destroy Congress' patent law, stating: "The Court has
recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionaryprinciple could eviscerate
patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,

natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
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balance will be restored in a broken aspect of patent law, thereby providing much
sought-after certainty back to current U.S. patent law. The enactment of America
Invents Act in 2013 was a leap forward and so too would be the case if Congress took
significant action concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101. This will have the knock-on effect of
returning our laws to once again encourage and reward entrepreneurial innovators to
take risks and develop, commercialize and bring new technologies to the marketplace.
Since the U.S. Constitution mandates Congress to enact laws to "promote the progress
of science and the useful arts," 22 such action would be squarely within Congress'
mandate.
II. Legislative History of 35 U.S. Code §101
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the
power to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 23 It has recently been proposed by other scholars that the wording of the
U.S. constitution itself not only grants Congress the power to create laws that promote
24
the progress of science, but that it also associates inventors with discoveries.
Congress has exclusive power and lawmakers decide how they will promote the
progress in science and the useful arts. One way to consider this is to first attempt to
define what kind of subject matter the country wishes to see progress in, and then
25
devise the necessary laws that are tailored to that goal. In legal terms, the statute at
the heart of this "which subject matter is eligible for a patent?" debate is the patent
eligibility statute under 35 U.S.C. § 101.26
The first time Congress passed a law to codify what can and cannot be patent
eligible subject matter was in the Patent Act of 1790,27 however, it was initially
Thomas Jefferson who first drafted a statute to "promote the progress of science and
useful arts." 2 8 In doing so, Jefferson relied heavily on established English law that
aimed to "to promote the progress of science and useful arts. . .by giving the public
at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a
29
period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of the inventor." While The
Patent Act of 1793, which Thomas Jefferson authored, repealed the Patent Act from
22
23
24

U.S.

art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
§ 8, cl. 8.
Sherry Knowles & Anthony Prosser, UnconstitutionalApplication of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S.
Supreme Court, 18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 144 (2018).
CONST.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,

25

Indisputably, nowadays, Patent Law is intractably tied to new technology development and

26

commercialization.
The U.S. Constitution excludes the word "patent," but there is also no explicit requirement for
Congress to advance certain technologies to progress science. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

27
28

29

Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-34, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
Id.

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829) (noting "it is obvious to the careful inquirer, that many
of the provisions of our Patent Act are derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed

in the construction of that of England").

8
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three years prior, it largely embodied the ideology of older English law, ultimately
defining patent eligible subject matter to be "any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement." 30
For the next 160 years, other Patent Acts were passed by Congress, including

the Patent Acts of 1794,31 1800,32 1832, 3 1836,34 1837, 3 1839,36 1842,

3

187038 and

many more. What is generally the takeaway, vis-a-vis the patent eligibility laws, is
that the subject matter eligible for patent protection remained largely unchanged for
160 years between 1793 and 1950s. The 1952 Act added certain definitions, however,
neither the 1952 Patent Act nor the recent America Invents Act of 2012 changed the
substance of patent eligibility laws as they existed in 1790s.
The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C.

§ 101, states:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. 39
A recent article by Knowles and Prosser traces the legislative history of patent
eligibility in detail and argues that Congress has largely kept the words "invents" and
"discovers" in subsequent statutory language and this has been intentional. 40 The
authors make the point that the reason this is important is that the Supreme Court has
effectively ignored the word "discovers" to suit their interpretation of the statute. For
example, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court recentlystated in Myriad, that:
"[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy
the §101 inquiry." 41 [emphasis added]. And yet, the express wording of the §101
statute says otherwise: "whoever invents or discovers.. ." Thus, Supreme Court's
recent activism, positing that just by discovering something you do not necessarily
satisfy the §101 inquiry runs directly against very long standing express statutory
language.
As Knowles and Prosser point out, the Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory
patent-eligible subject matters as "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof'
and this language has survived numerous Patent Acts in the ensuing 200+ years. It is
30

Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, Pub. L. No. 2-53, 1 Stat. 319 (1793).
Act of June 7, 1794, Pub. L. No. 3-61, 1 Stat. 393 (1794).
Act of Apr. 17, 1800, Pub. L. No. 6-25, 2 Stat. 37 (1800).
3 Act of July 3, 1832, Pub. L. No. 22-162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832).
34 Act of July 4, 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
3 Act of Mar. 3, 1837, Pub. L. No. 24-45, 5 Stat. 191 (1837).
36 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, Pub. L. No. 25-88, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
3
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, Pub. L. No. 27-263, 5 Stat. 543 (1842).
38 Act of July 8, 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
39 US Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
31
32

40
41

Knowles & Prosser supra note 24.

Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
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telling that Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the statutory language that has survived
over 200 years, had in mind that "ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement." 4 2 The Supreme Court has created exceptions to this statutory
language that run directly against not only the long standing statutory language by
creating exceptions to what the statute explicitly says would otherwise be patent
eligible subject matter, but also these Supreme Court created exceptions to patent
eligible subject matter run against the implicit intent of Congress to liberally
encourage ingenuity as Jefferson had intended and the ensuing Patent Acts left
unchanged for over 200 years.
This statutory intent is and has been for over 200 years to set a low threshold bar
to patentable subject matter, which the Supreme Court decades ago had recognized
when stating that this includes "anything under the sun made by man,"13 and yet, in
direct contrast to the 35 U.S.C. § 101 statute, its legislative history and Congress's
intent, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence now puts a very high bar on this threshold
§ 101 inquiry of what subject matter is even patent eligible.
III. Supreme Court's Jurisprudence on 35 U.S. Code §101
An issued patent provides a monopoly to the inventor to make, use and sell the
invention in the U.S. for a defined period of time. 44 It may be counterintuitive to the
non-patent scholar, however, even if an invention is found to be novel, not obvious,
to have utility, and to meet all of the technical requirements for a patent, a patent will
not issue unless, as a preliminary threshold matter, the invention is directed to subject
matter that the Patent Act, under 35 U.S. Code §101, has defined to be patent eligible
subject matter.
There are three 1 9 th century Supreme Court cases relating to the patent eligibility
issue worthy of discussion here, the oldest of which is the oft quoted Tatham
decision.4 5 This decision from 1852 is frequently quoted by the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit, and the quote that is often used from this case is that "a principle,
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; and these cannot
6
be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right."4
O'Reilly v. Morse47 (1853) is the old telegraph case, in which Morse sued
O'Reilly based on an invention that related to the use of repeaters to allow for long
48
distance transmission of a telegraph signal. The Supreme Court noted that Morse
had not enabled the full scope of his claim because he enabled only electromagnetic
42
43
44

4
46
47
48

V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1861). See also Knowles & Prosser
supra note 24 (giving a more detailed and thorough discussion on the legislative history of § 101).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
20 years from the priority filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
Id. at 175.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
Id

10
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repeaters. The Court referenced the Neilson English decision 9 from a decade prior
and concluded that Morse's patent claim 50 addresses all possible applications of a
physical principle, not a specific implementation of the principle. Thus, the court
found the patent claim to be ineligible subject matter.5
In Tilghman v. Proctor (1880),52 the patent claimed a process by which water
could be used at high temperature and pressure to make fatty acids and glycerin. The
Supreme Court first considered whether the earlier Morse decision held that processes
are not patentable. The Court clarified that a patent for a process is different from a
patent for a scientific principle, explaining that a patent claim fails if it is not a claim
to a particular machine, or a claim to a process for utilizing a principle. Thus, the
Court clarified that a patent claim to the principle itself is not patentable subject
matter. 3
A. 20th Century Decisions Relating to 35 U.S. Code §101
In just one decade starting in the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided three patent
law cases related to patent eligibility, namely Gottschalk v. Benson,54 Parker v.
Flook,55 and Diamondv. Diehr.56 Until the recent trilogy of Supreme Court decisions
on patent eligibility within a three year period in the current decade,57 discussed infra,
these older Supreme Court decisions provided the framework of how the Court
viewed the patent eligibility requirement under 35 U.S.C. §101.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Benson,58 a prominent decision since it was
the Supreme Court's first ruling on the patentability of software. In this decision, the
Supreme Court invalided a patent on a method for converting numbers from one
binary format to another. As Justice Douglas wrote for the majority, "the
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer." 59 It was the Court's view that mathematical
algorithms were not eligible subject matter for patent protection, and that such a
patent, if allowed to remain valid, would "wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula

Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 8 M&W 806, Web. Pat. Cas. 273 (1844).
50 Claim 8 in Morse's patent. "Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or
49

parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,
being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer." Morse,

56 U.S. at 86.
51i
52
5

Id. at 118-20.

54

409 U.S. 63 (1972).

55

437 U.S. 584 (1978).
450 U.S. 175 (1981).

56

Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1980).

Id. at 726-27.

51 See cases cited supra note 7.
58
Id.
59 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
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60
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." This was the first
instance in which abstract ideas were described as a separate category of ineligible
subject matter by the Supreme Court,6 1 albeit the Court had previously distinguished
between principles, such as laws of nature, and practical applications of those
principles.62

It was the belief of many at the time and in the ensuing years after Benson that
algorithms are laws of nature, and that an algorithm is nothing more than a discovery
of a fundamental truth, in contrast to an invention, and therefore an algorithm is not
eligible subject matter for patenting. The Court did, however, leave some room to
3
patent what it referred to in Benson as "a program servicing a computer."6 A
computer program or software is nothing more than a complex mathematical
algorithm, instructing a computer to solve a problem. Thus, it remains to this day
somewhat confusing that Benson did not find a mathematical algorithm (computer
program) to be patent eligible subject matter, yet the Court suggested it would allow
a patent that covered a "program servicing a computer.""
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided Flook, a decision that was effectively later
overruled by the Court in two subsequent decisions in Chakrabarty and Diehr. In
Flook, the patent application was for a "Method for Updating Alarm Limits."6
Except for Flook's mathematical algorithm, the method was identical to previous
systems.6 6 Although six years earlier the Supreme Court had decided in Benson that
the discovery of a new formula is not patentable, here in Flook, the claimed method
differed in that it included a specific application of the algorithm, catalytic conversion
67
of hydrocarbons in the instant case. The Court relied on the old English Neilson
decision and its progeny, to find that Flook's patent claim did not contain patent
eligible subject matter because it was a "principle" or a "law of nature."
Controversially, the Supreme Court in Flook focused on the "inventive
9
concept"68 rather than merely focusing attention on a patent claim "as a whole."6 The
Court opined that "even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula
may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented.
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there
70
is some other inventive concept in its application." Interestingly, although

60

Id. at 72.

61

Id. at 68, 72.

63

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.

62
6
65

Id.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585..

66

Id.

67
68

Neilson v. Harford (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Ex.).

69

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

70

Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
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71
Chakrabarty
and Diehr had effectively overruled Flook, this case is making a
revival since the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Bilski (2010) and Mayo
(2012) favorably looked upon and aligned with the Flook decision. Yet, the lower
courts continue to follow Diehr and Chakrabarty, as well as the recently decided
Mayo and Alice decisions.

In 1981, three years after Flook, the Supreme Court decided Diehr. Diehr's
invention related to a math equation, a computer program, to determine the curing
time for rubber so that one could make better precision molded rubber products. 72
Here, the invention comprised a software algorithm, as well as some physical items
like a molding press, to achieve a specific result of curing rubber. The Court held that
the execution of a physical process, controlled by running a computer program, was
patent eligible subject matter, noting that although software algorithms could not be
patented, the mere presence of a software element did not make an otherwise patenteligible machine or process an ineligible subject matter for patenting. Therefore,
unlike the method claims in Benson and Flook, the Court found the method in Diehr
to be patent eligible subject matter because the claims did not "foreclose from others
the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed
process" 73 when they were "considered as a whole." 74
Thus, the key question in Diehr centered on the implementation of the algorithm
and how it applied in the method; more particularly, whether the mathematical
algorithm "transforms and reduces. . .an article 'into a different state or thing."' 75 The
Court in Diehrrepeated its position that abstract mathematical formulas are not patent
eligible subject matter, and that using abstract mathematical formulas in a physical
machine or process is different to a claim solely to an algorithm in the abstract.
As such, in each of Benson, Flook and Diehr, a different vision of the statutory
law governing patent eligible subject matter, namely 35 U.S.C. §101, emerged. Yet,
what emerged from the final Diehr case of this Supreme Court trilogy of cases on
patent eligibility from some forty years ago is that the Court underlined two
traditional understandings of the law on patent eligibility. First, that abstract
principles are not patent eligible, and yet practical applications of those principles are
patent eligible, 76 and second that prior art and issues related novelty, obviousness or
inventiveness play no role in determining patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101.77
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980).
U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142 (issued Aug. 10, 1982) (directed to "Direct digital control of rubber
molding presses.").
73 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187.
74 Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594.
75 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
7l

72

76

Id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."); at 191 ("We recognize,

of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon
of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that
formula in the abstract.").
77

Id. at 188-89 ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of

2019]

To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish

13

The Supreme Court Created Exceptions to 35 U.S. Code §101

After the Diehr decision in 1981 and for approximately the next thirty years, the
Supreme Court went quiet on §101, and this allowed most stakeholders and patent
professionals to believe that the state of patent eligibility laws articulated in those
cases had generally settled and could be relied upon. During this thirty-year period,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit meanwhile began interpreting and relying
on the Diehr decision to broaden the scope of patent eligible subject matter under the
35 U.S.C. §101 statute. As an example, the Federal Circuit found that business
method claims that were previously patent-ineligible subject matter were now
potentially patent eligible where such business methods achieve a "useful, concrete
and tangible result.""
This was a radical turn taken by the Federal Circuit in State Street,79 and,
unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case to correct the
mistake. 80 The Federal Circuit's eyebrow raising shift was seen by some as the
Court's apt ability to adapt to new and innovative concepts and technological
advances, all the while keeping true to the foundational lessons from the Supreme
Court's Diehr decision. Yet, the reality was the bizarre specter of having a surge in
business method related patent applications on anything from offering arbitration and
legal services, tax planning, and even an application aimed at a system for booking
toilets. Relying on the Supreme Court's Diehrdecision and its own interpretation of
it, the Federal Circuit and majority of stakeholders and IP professionals considered
81
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101 to be a "coarse filter" through which the vast
majority of patent applications pass with very few 35 U.S.C. §101 rejections being
made by examiners at the patent office.
Yet, all this changed when the Supreme Court rendered four patent eligibility
82
decisions spanning 2010-2014, with Bilski being the first.

no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories
of possibly patentable subject matter.").
78

State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

79

State St. overruled the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, noting it had "little, if any, applicability to
determining the presence of statutory subject matter." Id at 1374. Yet, the court in State Street set
forth a "'useful, concrete, and tangible result[s]"' test. Id. at 1373 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
The Supreme Court never accepted this test, questioning its viability. See Lab. Corp. of Am.

80

See State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (denying petition

Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006).
for writ of certiorari).
Research Corporation Tech, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
82 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
81
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21"t Century Decisions Relating to 35 U.S. Code §101: Supreme
Court's Expansion of the Scope of Its Own Exceptions to 35 U.S.

Code §101
Almost thirty years after their Diehr decision, the Supreme Court decided
Bilski.83 In Bilski, the inventors' patent application claimed methods for hedging risks
for commodities trading. After the USPTO rejected the application under 35 U.S.C.
§101 for being directed to an abstract idea, the case was appealed and the Federal
Circuit heard it en banc, perhaps wishing to amend their State Street decision which
had controversially opened the door for patenting ways of doing business.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO, and in tune with Supreme Court
precedent, held that processes can be patented only if they are implemented by a
machine or transformed something into a new or different thing. The court found that
Bilski's method was not patent eligible subject matter because "transformations or
manipulations of. . .business risks or other such abstractions cannot meet the test
because they are not physical objects or substances." 84 While the Federal Circuit was
careful to affirm that business methods are still patentable, the Court did reject their
own "useful concrete and tangible result" 85 test in State Street, acknowledging that
the State Street decision had paved the way for patents on everyday activities that had
no connection to technological innovation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court issued a total of three opinions, consisting of a
plurality opinion for the Court and two concurring opinions. Although no single
opinion was joined by a majority of Justices for all of its parts, in Bilski, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's rejection of Bilski's patent claims, but under
different reasoning. The Supreme Court in Bilski held that the Federal Circuit's
"machine-or-transformation" test "is a useful and important clue an investigative
tool" for patentability but not the sole or exclusive test for identifying patentable
methods. Thus, the Court's failure to provide a bright line workable §101 framework
effectively resulted in the uncertainty of patent-eligible subject matter being left for
the lower courts to grapple with. 86
After Bilski in 2010, the Supreme Court turned to Biotechnology and a
subcategory of innovative and highly financially lucrative technologies within this
biomedical sector, more specifically, attention turned to patent eligibility of
inventions in the field of medical diagnostics. It is in this Mayo decision, 87 the first of

83

Id

84

Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.

"
86

State St. set forth a "'useful, concrete, and tangible results"' test. Id. at 1373.
Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the PromisedLand:
Bilski 's Superficial Textualism andthe Missed Opportunity to Return PatentLaw to Its Technology
Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1289, 1304 (2011) (stating "the Supreme Court's methodology and
analysis for determining whether a process falls within the scope of patentable subject matter could

hardly be more opaque").
87 Mayo Collaborative Sers. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
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the trio of patent eligibility cases the Supreme Court decided in the space of as many
years, that an ill-advised radical shift surfaced. It should stand noted that at the time
of the Mayo decision, there was a chorus amongst many on the patent bar that as a
result of the Federal Circuit's expansive interpretation of Supreme Court's Diehr
decision over many years, there was a glut of low quality superfluous patents being
issued which was ultimately having a stifling effect on technological innovation in
America. It is in this context that the Mayo decision was born.
In Mayo, the Court drew on old case law, including from an old English case
90
Neilson,8 8 and Supreme Court's own O'Reilly,89 and Funk Brothers decisions to
then suggest that the real test for determining patent eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 was not whether the patent claim had a practicalapplication,but rather
9
whether the patent claim had an inventive applicationof an underlying principle. 1
1.

InterpretingMayo's "Laws of Nature" (2012)

In Mayo, the invention related to a method for optimizing the efficacy of a drug
used to treat an autoimmune related gastrointestinal disorder. 92 In particular, the
patent claimed methods for calibrating the dosage of thiopurine drugs used for
treating certain autoimmune diseases. In effect, the method involved the doctor
administering a thiopurine drug, waiting to take a blood sample later to see if the
metabolite of the drug was high or low and then based on this reading, deciding to
administer more drug or less. Thus, the claimed methods involved measuring
metabolites of the drug to optimize therapeutic efficacy while minimizing toxicity.
93
In Mayo, the Supreme Court found that the patent claims "do nothing more
than simply describe the natural relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will

88
89

Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 132-133 (1853).

90

See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). In this case, the inventor
did not create the strains of bacteria and the strains that were central to this invention, and therefore
were 'phenomena of nature' and unpatentable. While mixing different strains into one product was
an application of the natural phenomena, the invention was deemed unpatentable subject matter
because it amounted to no more than an alternate way to package the product.

91

See Mayo 566 U.S. at 66, 72-73 (emphasis added).

92

Id. at 74-75. (The independent patent claim at issue in Mayo recited "[a] method of optimizing
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a)
administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230
pmol per 8x 108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8x 108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered

to said subject."(emphasis added)).
93 Id. at 92.
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prove ineffective or cause harm," 94 stating further that the correlation between the
levels of a drug metabolite in blood with either an overdose or underdose of the drug
is an unpatentable law of nature. "The relation is a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body - entirely natural processes. And
so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural law." 95 The Court in
Mayo articulated its belief that, when a method involves a natural law or abstract idea,
it must also contain "an inventive concept," which the Court defined as "other
elements or a combination of elements . .. sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself." 96
The Court compared the instant claim to its past precedent in Diehr (subject
matter held patent eligible) and Flook (subject matter held patent ineligible),
concluding that the patent claims provide mere "instructions" and that "Because
methods for making such determinations were well known in the art, this step simply
tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by scientists in the field, Such activity is normally not sufficient to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a
law." 97
Thus, in Mayo, the Supreme Court indicated that the real test for determining
patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 was not whether the patent claim
had a practical application, but rather whether the patent claim had an inventive
applicationof an underlying principle. This amounts to greatly increasing the scope
of the Supreme Court created exceptions to the statute that explicitly outlines what
can and cannot be patent eligible subject matter. Even the U.S. government warned
the Supreme Court in its Amicus Curiae in this case, advising that the statutory
language should not be discarded and ultimately suggesting to keep a low threshold
bar for determining what subject matter is patent eligible and then leaving the higher
bars to patentability on other parts of the Patent Act best suited for that task, namely
novelty under §102 and obviousness under § 103.98
2.

InterpretingMyriad's "Natural Phenomenon" (2013)

One year after its Mayo decision, the Supreme Court confronted the
controversial issue of the patent eligibility of genomic inventions. Innovations in
these kinds of technologies had taken on great significance, especially since the
completion of the Human Genome Project in 2000. In Myriad,99 the Supreme Court
held that genomic DNA was subject matter that is ineligible for a patent under 35
U.S.C. §101 because of the "product of nature" (preexisting substances found in
nature) judicial exception. Although case law had found that such products of nature
94
95
96
97
98

99

Id.
Id at 77.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-193 (1981); Id At 72-73 (emphasis added).
Id at 67.
Mayo, 566 U.S. 66.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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may not be patent eligible, per se, prior to this decision, courts took the view that such
claims would be patent eligible if the claim included significant artificial changes
made to the product of nature, perhaps by purifying, isolating or altering in any way.
Myriad followed just one year after the alarming Mayo decision. In Myriad, the
overarching technology related to the eligibility of isolated DNA sequences, methods
for predicting the likelihood of cancer developing in a patient by examining mutations
in DNA sequences, and also methods to identify anti-cancer drugs using the isolated
DNA sequences. In particular, Myriad involved two genes, named BRCA1 and
BRCA2, and the discovery that certain mutations in those genes are associated with
00
a predisposition of a patient to developing breast and ovarian cancer.1 Myriad's
invention represented a significant advancement in cancer treatment. Yet, as soon as
Myriad began a strategy to stop competing laboratories from providing its patent test,
0
health care providers publicized this " and a group of medical professionals and
associations sued Myriad in order to invalidate its patents on § 101 grounds, arguing
that isolated DNA is a product of nature and therefore is patent ineligible subject
matter. 0 2 This case was highly publicized in the media and ultimately went up to the
Supreme Court.
Going against three decades of practice to the contrary at the time, Justice
Thomas for the Supreme Court held that while claims directed specifically to the
complementary DNA (cDNA) for the breast cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, were
patent-eligible, claims to an isolated nucleic acid encoding the BRCA1/2 genes were
not patent eligible because they are "a natural product."
This decision, like Mayo, greatly expanded the Supreme Court created
exceptions to the patent eligibility laws under the 35 U.S.C. §101 statue. The reason
being that with this Myriad decision, the Supreme Court reversed thirty years of U.S.
Patent Office practice of granting exactly that kind of patent for isolated nucleic acid
sequences. To highlight the weight of this decision, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
03
Office had issued over 50,000 U.S. patents relating in part to DNA' and all of these
were now subject to this seesaw reversal because of this expansion to the "natural
product" exception to the statute that the Supreme Court created under Myriad.
Immediately following Myriad, the Federal Circuit invalidated patents en mass
lo See id at 592. For example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 recites: "An isolated DNA coding
for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the [following] amino acid sequenceFalse" For
the sake of transparency, the author of this article was a member of the IP law group of a large
international law firm in NYC that developed the patent portfolio for this innovator concerning their
breast and ovarian cancer technology.
12 GENETICS IN
101 Julia Carbone & E. Richard Gold, Myriad Genetics:In the Eye of the Policy Storm,
20
10142a.pdf.
MED 38, S41 -S44 (2010), http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/v12/nls/pdf/gim

102 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186-89
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).

03 Guyan Lian, Molecules or Carriers of Biological Information: A Chemist's Perspective on the
Patentabilityof Isolated Genes, 22 ALB. L. J. OF SCI. AND TECH. 133 (2012).
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on the basis of this Supreme Court created exception to statutory language outlining,
under 35 U.S.C. §101, patent eligible subject matter. 104 As an example, when
Professor Dennis Lo and colleagues at Oxford University discovered that cell-free
foetal DNA ("cffDNA") could be detected in the plasma and serum of pregnant
women, they obtained U.S., European and Australian patents for methods for
detecting this cffDNA using standard techniques their discovery. Their discovery
centered around detecting abnormalities and characteristics of unborn children. In the
U.S., the Federal Circuit in Ariosa'0 5 invalidated claims for non-invasive methods of
detecting cffDNA from a blood sample of a pregnant woman. 06 According to the
Court, the only new and useful subject matter in the method "was the discovery of
the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum." 10 7
Judge Linn indicated that he concurred "only because" he was bound by the
breadth of Mayo. He indicated that Ariosa "represents the consequence - perhaps
unintended - of that broad language in Mayo excluding a meritorious invention from
the patent protection it deserves." Indeed, once an en banc hearing was denied in
Ariosa, several Judges on the Federal Circuit used the opportunity to express concern
that such discoveries were not able to overcome the Supreme Court's very high new
threshold bar to what the Court unilaterally has determined is and is not patent eligible
subject matter. This new high threshold bar, as discussed throughout this article, was
created out of thin air and directly conflicts with the statutory language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and its legislative's intent.
For example, Judge Lourie stated that "it is unsound to have a rule that takes
inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility ... But I agree ... under
Supreme Court precedent it had no option other than to affirm" the claims' patentineligibility. Similarly, Judge Dyk said, "we are bound by the language of Mayo, and
any further guidance must come from the Supreme Court." On appeal, the Supreme
Court passed on the opportunity to correct its decision in Mayo by denying certiorari
in 2016, a decision that disappointed many observers because even though there were
23 amicus briefs filed encouraging the Court to grant certiorari in Ariosa, the Court
did not even ask the Solicitor General's opinion. 08
3.

InterpretingAlice's "Inventive Concept" (2014)

One year after its Myriad decision, the Supreme Court considered the
patentability of a computer-implemented financial trading exchange system. It is
104 Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
105

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2015).

106

Id

107

Id

108 Albeit, that stance may be changing since the Supreme Court recently
asked for the Solicitor
General's decision on two patent eligibility appeals currently pending before the Court. Currently
pending opportunities for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari include in Berkheimer, Vanda, and
Athena Diagnostics. It remains to be seen; it is interesting that this time, unlike in Ariosa, the
Supreme Court has indeed invited the Solicitor General to submit a brief in both Berkheimer and in
Vanda; for Athena Diagnostics, a petition for certiorariis expected to be filed within weeks.
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significant to note that before this case was appealed up to the Supreme Court, there
was a highly divided en banc decision at the Federal Circuit regarding whether this
computer-implemented subject matter was eligible for a patent under the 35 U.S.C.
§101. Interestingly, Judge Rader, the Chief Judge at the Federal Circuit at the time,
referred to the CAFC's inability to render a majority opinion in Alice as "the biggest
failure of his career."1 09 In his view, interpretation of §101 was settled law, based on
Diehr and Chakrabarty. Of separate note, was Judge Moore's dissent in Alice, in
which she was joined by three other judges, stating that:
I am concerned that the current interpretation of §101, and in
particularthe abstract idea exception, is causing a free fall in the
patent system. The Supreme Court has taken a number of our recent
decisions and, in each instance, concluded that the claims at issue
were not patent-eligible. See Bilski, Prometheus, Myriad (under
consideration)... holding that all claims are all patent-ineligible
under §101. Holding that all of these claims are directed to no more
than an abstract idea gives staggeringbreadth to what is meant to be
a narrowjudicialexception. And let's be clear: if all of these claims,
including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case is the
death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business
method, financial system, and software patents as well as many
computer implemented and telecommunications patents.' 10
As another indication of how split the Federal Circuit was when it decided Alice,
Judge Newman stated in her dissent in Alice:
I propose that the court return to the statute, and hold that when the
subject matter is within the statutory classes in section 101, eligibility
is established. This conforms with legislative intent. See Diamondv.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144
(1980) ("In choosing such expansive terms as "manufacture" and
"composition of matter," modified by the comprehensive "any,"
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope.").'
Yet, on appeal from the Federal Circuit, Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme
Court, underlined the Court's two-part test for identifying patent ineligible subject
matter, namely patent claims to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.

109 Dan Levine, Insight: Rocker judge juggles tech policy, Supreme Court and the Stones, REUTERS
(Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-judge-rader-insight/insight-rocker-judge2

juggles-tech-policy-supreme-court-and-the-stones-idUSBRE9BA06D 0131211.
10 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff'd, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)
(emphasis added).
"' Id.
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First, the claim is analyzed to see if any of these exceptions to the statute apply." 2 If
so, then the patent claim is reviewed to determine whether the claim recites additional
elements that transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of any of those
three exceptions to the statute." 3 The Court described this second step of the test as
determining whether the claim incorporates an "inventive concept" that amounts to
more than merely applying the law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea to
a particular technological environment.1 4 With this framework established, Justice
Thomas applied the Mayo/Alice two-step process to first determine that the method
claims were drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. The Court then
determined that the patented claims amounted to nothing more than implementation
of an abstract idea on a computer.
Alice thus confirms that Mayo's test should be used to determine if abstract ideas
are ineligible under §101."5 The Alice decision reiterated that abstract ideas are not
patentable because granting a monopoly to an abstract idea would stifle innovation.
And, a claim that recites an abstract idea must include "additional features" to be
patentable. Alice also confirms that Mayo 's two-step analysis should be applied to all
types of claims." 6
In Mayo 1 7 and Alice," 8 the Supreme Court thus adopted a two-step test for
determining patent eligibility under § 101, giving rise to the expansion of the
Supreme Court created exceptions. These three Supreme-Court-created exceptions
are exceptions to the four categories of subject matter explicitly listed in the 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 statute as being patent eligible." 9 That is, even if an invention falls within one
of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter under the statute, it can still be
found to be ineligible subject matter because of the Supreme Court created exceptions
to the statutory language.

'

Although the purpose of the Mayo/Alice test is to provide a framework for
determining patent-ineligible subject matter, for example differentiating an abstract
idea from claims to a "patent-eligible application" of any such concept, 2 0 it has been
very difficult for patent stakeholders, including examiners, inventors, patent owners,
patent lawyers, and judges alike to implement and/or interpret because there has been
little to no clarity concerning where the boundaries of § 101 are.' 2
112

Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).

113

Id.

Id. at 2355.
Id.
116 Id. at 2355, 2357.
"
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
118 Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2347.
'19 The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), states: "Whoever invents
"4
"5

or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."

120 Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357.

121 See Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox Inc., 226 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ("This
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IV. The Scope of Patent Eligibility Laws Requires Clarity
The time is ripe for Congress to revisit the 35 U.S.C. § 101 statute of the Patent
Act. All patent stakeholders working in the field of technology and innovation need
clarity concerning the scope of patent eligible subject matter. Some, including other
Intellectual Property law professors,122 advance the proposition of amending the
statute so as to not be out of line with Supreme Court's promulgated exceptions to
the statute. On the other spectrum, others, like the former Director of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, have recently advocated for wholesale repealing of the entire
35 U.S.C. § 101 statute from the Patent Act. As it stands, the four recent Supreme
Court decisions123 have dramatically narrowed the scope of patent protection for
innovation-dependent industries by significantly expanding the judicially-created
exceptions to subject matter that is listed in the statute as eligible for a patent.
Here, for the sake of bringing clarity to this area of law, I propose a middle
ground that does not repeal the statute that has largely remained unchanged for over
200 years, but equally, does not propose amendments to the statute in order to keep
the Supreme Court's own parallel jurisprudence in place. Instead, I advocate we
return to the statutory language and intent, suggesting a timely option for Congress
to do away with the three exceptions that the Supreme Court has unilaterally foisted
upon the patent-eligible-subject-matter statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101. This position is very
similar to the one taken by Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit in the highly divided
Alice decision.
Discord among patent stakeholders is growing, precipitated by the lack of clarity
Court agrees with those judges who have observed that even post-Enfish, the Mayo/Alice test
provides limited practical guidance for distinguishing software and computer patents that are valid
under § 101 from those that are not."); Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2016) ("A search for a single test or definition of what an 'abstract idea' encompasses in
the decided cases concerning § 101 from this court, and indeed from the Supreme Court, reveals that
at present there is no such single, succinct, usable definition or test."); Intellectual Ventures I LLC

v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1328 (describing the "semantic gymnastics" entailed in applying
the Mayo/Alice test to software patents) (Mayer, J., concurring); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v.
AT&T Mobility, 827 F.3d 1341, 1354 ("I have come upon no guide to when a claim crosses the
boundary between unacceptable abstractness and acceptable specificity.") (Newman, J., concurring);
Device Enhancement LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 189 F.Supp.3d 392, 400, 401 (D. Del. 2016)
(discussing the "still difficult-to-discern requirements of the Alice analysis," and the resulting
"difficult exercise" under § 101); Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement at 7,

Ameranth, Inc. v. Genesis Gaming Solutions, Inc., 11-cv-00189 AG (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2015)
("True, it is difficult to understand the difference between (1) a claim "directed" to an abstract idea
but saved by an "inventive concept," and (2) a patent not "directed" to an abstract idea in the first
place, but that nonetheless can be said to "embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply" an abstract idea.
Alice, 134 S.Ct at 2354. But in patents, no less than all other areas of the law, Courts must do their
best to follow Supreme Court rulings, no matter how unsatisfying.").
22 For example, professors Jeffrey Lefstin and Peter Menell.
123 Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576

(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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regarding the scope of subject matter that is eligible for a patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. For example, not only has David Kappos, the Director of the US Patent
Trademark Office (USPTO) from 2009 to 2013, called for Congress to repeal the
entire 35 U.S.C. § 101 statute from the Patent Act on the basis that it is unworkable,
but even the current acting Director of the USPTO, as recently as in 2019 and after
releasing a dizzying fifth set of guidelines to patent examiners at the USPTO in as
many years, 2 4 indicated that the landscape of patent-eligible subject matter remains
troubling. Senior judges too are concerned with current jurisprudence on 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as discussed supra in Alice.
Also, the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) recently adopted a
resolution to support legislation to amend the statute by adding two subsections. In
the IPO statement, they said that the "proposed legislative language would address
patent-eligibility concerns by reversing the Supreme Court decisions and restoring
the scope of subject matter eligibility to that intended by Congress ... ; defining the
scope of subject matter eligibility more clearly and in a technology-neutral
manner;...; and simplifying the. . . eligibility analysis."125 More tellingly, a U.S.
Senator recently gave a speech at a conference entitled, "The Supreme Court's
Section 101 Jurisprudence: Dangers for the Innovation Economy," in which he said
that subject matter eligibility is "an area where the jurisprudence is insufficiently
clear, and which may necessitate congressional action to provide clarity and
consistency."
Thus, it is clear there is great concern across all sectors of the U.S. economy,
especially by stakeholders in the Biotechnology and Software-driven industries, that
current law on patent eligibility is unclear and is having deleterious consequences.
The Patent Act, as noted supra, defines and specifies four independent
categories of subject matter of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for patent
protection: 1) processes or methods; 2) machines or apparatuses; 3) manufactures;
and 4) compositions of matter. 12 6 While it is clear from the Statute that Congress
intended to give a wide scope to patent-eligible subject matter, from these four broad
categories that are listed in the statute, the Supreme Court has judicially created three
exceptions of subject matter ineligible for patent protection: 1) laws of nature; 2)
products of nature; and 3) abstract ideas. Thus, under current law, a claimed invention
is only patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if it is a process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, and also if it falls outside the three Supreme Court
124 See

125

USPTO,

Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas (January 7,
2019),

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples _37to42_20190107.pdf
(providing examples of how to apply the new patent-eligibility analysis under the 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance).
Intellectual Property Owners Association, ProposedAmendments To PatentEligible Subject Matter

Under
35
U.S.C
§ 101
(February
7,
2017),
http://www.ipo.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf
(emphasis added).
126
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promulgated judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter.
Jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101,
has currently entered a "maw" and the situation will only get worse as new
technologies advance because these new advances will challenge courts'
12 7
There is no question that current
interpretations of certain aspects of patent law.
law governing patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is uncertain and in upheaval.
One of the key concerns is that the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Congress's
intent has been to place a low threshold bar to determine what is subject matter
eligible for a patent, 12 8 and leave for other more stringent areas of the Patent Act,
namely specific legal requirements focusing on novelty, non-obviousness, and
description of the technical features of the invention, to deal with the ultimate
question of whether the subject matter should receive a patent or not. According to
the Supreme Court's own words, the exceptions they created to the 35 U.S.C. §101
29
and to "eviscerate patent
statute have the power to "swallow all of patent law"'
13 0
This is because 35 U.S.C. §101 was not written or intended to forego an
law."
analysis under different statutory sections of the Patent Act of whether major
breakthrough discoveries can receive a patent (i.e., by discussing if the discovery is
new and not obvious in view of others' work, and in view of how it is technically
described).
The Supreme Court has now heard four cases in the area of patent eligibility
recently, 13' namely Bilski in 2010, Mayo in 2012, Myriad in 2013 and Alice in 2014.
After four back-to-back attempts in recent years, the Court has been unable to identify
a coherent test that comports with the statute and provides adequate objective
guidance to patent examiners, jurists, and practitioners alike. If anything, these
decisions have had the opposite effect and have caused havoc in innovationdependent industries. The four Supreme Court decisions have dramatically narrowed
the scope of patent protection for Biotechnology and Software-driven emerging new
technologies by significantly expanding the judicially-created exceptions to statutory
patent-eligible subject matter.
Although the Supreme Court has previously overruled itself on patent eligibility,

127 Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

1217,

1224 (2013); Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court and § 101 Jurisprudence:Reconciling SubjectMatter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 629, 658

(2014).
28

129

See infra section 11 of this paper for a discussion on Legislative History of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (advising the lower courts to "tread carefully in construing this

exclusionaryprinciple lest it swallow all ofpatent law.") (emphasis added).

10 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (warning that the Court's own judicially created exceptions to the statute
have the power to destroy Congress' patent law: "The Court has recognized, however, that too broad
an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.").

13' Alice, 573 U.S. at 212; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 579-80; Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 597.
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namely in the Chakrabartyand Diehr decisions that effectively overruled Flook, it
appears unwilling to overrule or at least revise its recent incoherent decisions, most
notably in Mayo, evidenced by the fact that the Court denied certiorariin Sequenom,
a case that many saw as an opportune moment for the Court to correct itself.' 32 In this
latter example, over twenty amicus briefs from a variety of interested parties and
industries were filed and yet the Supreme Court did not even ask for the Solicitor
General's view.
Thus, if the Supreme Court is unwilling or unable to provide a reasonable,
workable test, then legislative options to fix the current status are sorely needed, as
discussed infra in the last section of this article.
A.

U.S. Supreme Court's Own Parallel Law on Patent Eligibility is
Inconsistent with 35 U.S. Code §101, and Runs Against the U.S.
Constitution

It is clear and uncontroversial that in an area of law where the U.S. Constitution
has given sole authority to Congress to create laws consistent with that granted
authority, the judicial branch's highest court, namely the U.S. Supreme Court, is then
limited to that particular statutory construction.133 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized this as such in the 21" century, stating that "when 'the statute's language
is plain, the sole function of the courts'-at least where the disposition required by the
text is not absurd-'is to enforce it according to its terms.""3 4 The Supreme Court in
ConnecticutNat'l Bank cited several cases to support this notion, stating that "courts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there"' 3 5 and going even further to be clear that "when the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last... judicial inquiry is
complete" 136 For appeals involving patents, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit possesses national jurisdiction, 3 7 with the Supreme Court retaining
discretionary authority to review cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit.13 1
However, once the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a case where Congress has
created laws, the Court is then limited to that statutory construction.
Accordingly, in this context, when the Supreme Court accepts to a question of
patent law related to patent eligible subject matter, the Supreme Court is required to
construe the literal meaning of 35 U.S. Code §101, in order to decide if a particular
subject matter is or is not patent eligible. And yet, in a trilogy of cases decided in as

132 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S.Ct.

2511 (2016).

133 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
1" Hartford UnderwritersIns. Co. v. Union PlantersBank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Ron PairEnterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
'3
Connecticut Nat'lBank, 503 U.S. at 253-54.
136

Id

137

28 U.S.C.A. §1295(a)(1).

138 28 U.S.C.A. §1254(1).
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many years in this decade, discussed supra, the Supreme Court has departed from the
literal meaning of the statue to instead fashion its own law in the area of patent
eligibility by creating exceptions to the statute, thereby unintentionally conflating
other existing statutory regimes concerning patentability with the threshold issue of
patent eligibility by requiring an "inventive application" in the patent eligible subject
matter determination. This is so, even where Congress recently passed the America
Invents Act39, the biggest fundamental change in Patent Law in sixty years, where
major changes were made to the law on patentability but those on patentable subject
14 0
matter, under 35 U.S. Code § 101, were left largely untouched.
Congress has been consistent with their intent concerning patent eligible subject
matter. Indeed, based on the legislative history of 35 U.S. Code §101, discussed
supra, and the fact that multiple Patent Acts passed by Congress over a period of
some 200 years, including the recently passed America Invents Act, have kept the
language of the short 35 U.S. Code §101 statute largely unchanged, it is clear that no
exceptions were contemplated. These Supreme Court created exceptions to the statute
represent a direct afront to the statute, and run contrary to Congress's express and
implicit intent as well as their mandate to "promote the useful arts" as the U.S.
Constitution requires.
Moreover, the statute clearly mentions "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. . . may obtain a
141
Thus, the
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
test for
recent
their
in
concept"
"inventive
with
Supreme Court's fascination
there
should
only
Not
exceptions to the statute fails to consider the word "discovers."
be no exceptions to the four statutory categories of patent eligible subject matter as
adumbrated in the 35 U.S. Code §101 statute, namely processes, machines,
manufactures or compositions of matter, but that any "invention or discovery " related
to these four statutory listed categories should suffice to pass this low-intended
threshold finding of whether a subject matter is deemed patent eligible.
Because it does not fit their new test for their own exceptions to this statute, the
Supreme Court fails to acknowledge or discuss, indeed omits, any focus on the word
"discovers" in their patent eligibility jurisprudence. There is a reason that the statute
includes this word and, if anything, there is nothing to indicate that the word
"discovers" ought to have anything less than equal weight to the word "invents" when
the statute recites "invents or discovers." And yet, Justice Thomas, writing for the
Supreme Court recently in Myriad boldly refutes this, stating "groundbreaking,
4
innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry."
19

See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act ("AIA"), Pub.L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
§ 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,

40 See 35 U.S.C.A.

manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
141

35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (emphasis added).

142 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
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Thus, for example, discovering certain unique fetal DNA in the blood of a
pregnant mother and inventing a new method for non-invasively determining
important fetal characteristics that is safer for both the fetus and the pregnancy, as
discussed infra, should simply not be failing the patent eligibility test under 35 U.S.
Code §101, as it recently has done. 4 3 It may not be patentable if routine methods
were used to develop the method, but the mere discovery itself ought to pass the 35
U.S. Code §101 threshold inquiry. The patentability requirements as listed in the
other statutes of the Patent Act, for example whether it is new and non-obvious in
view of what others have done, ought to be what determines whether such a discovery
should obtain a U.S. patent or not.
As Judge Linn stated in a concurring opinion in Ariosa that prior to the invention,
prenatal diagnosis involved invasive techniques that could potentially harm the fetus
and increase the chance of a miscarriage and that he saw "no reason, in policy or
statute. .. why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent ineligible."' 44
Interestingly, after Ariosa was decided in the U.S., this same invention was found in
November 2017 to be patent eligible subject matter by the highest court of the United
Kingdom, and also, as recently as in August 2019, it was found to be patent eligible
by the highest court of Australia. With the U.S. Supreme Court refusing to grant
certiorariin Ariosa, this technology and many like it remain patent ineligible subject
matter in the U.S., based on the misguided current Supreme Court jurisprudent on 35

U.S. Code §101.
Further still, as the Supreme Court itself stated in Chakrabarty,145 "Congress has
intended patentable subject matter to include anything under the sun that is made by
man."1 4 6 The Court further explained §101 eligibility and its scope, stating that "We
have cautioned that courts 'should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.' United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp, 289 U.S. 178 (1933)... In choosing such expansive terms as
'manufacture' and 'composition of matter' modified by the comprehensive 'any,'
Congressplainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."14?
Thus, no exceptions were contemplated, so long as any invention or discovery fell
within the four categories of patent eligible subject matter that have been listed in the
statute for approximately the last two hundred years. If anything, as is clear from both
the express language of the statute and its legislative history discussed supra, the
patent eligible subject matter under the 35 U.S. Code §101 statute should be given
wide scope.
The Supreme Court's recent trilogy of back-to-back cases on patent eligibility

l43 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4 Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
'4 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
146 Kappos, 561 S.Ct. at 641-642 (noting Congress's intention for statutory subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man") (quoting Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309).
147 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
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in this decade runs against the wording of 35 U.S. Code § 101 and its legislative intent,
is inconsistent, and provide next to no analysis of statutory construction or legislative
intent. Instead, out of thin air, the Supreme Court has created widely expansive
"judicial exceptions" to the federal statute that outlines the threshold inquiry
concerning patent eligible subject matter. This contrarian jurisprudence by the
Supreme Court on patent eligibility and their focus on "inventive concept" and
"significantly more" has caused disarray across the vast majority of stakeholders in
industries, as well as the Courts and the patent office, and is otherwise harming the
innovation ecosystem in America, as discussed infra.
B.

Application of the Mayo/Alice Test is Causing Disarray in Courts and
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

The Mayo/Alice test provides a two-criteria test for determining if a subject
matter is eligible for a patent or not. First, the claimed invention must be one of the
four statutory categories. 148 Second, to qualify for patent eligible subject matter, the
patent claim must not be directed to a judicial exception unless the claim as a whole
includes additional limitations amounting to significantly more than the exception.
These judicial exceptions have been created by the Supreme Court and are
subject matter that the Court has found to be outside of, or exceptions to, the four
statutory categories of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.
Specifically, the judicial exceptions include and are limited to abstract ideas, laws of
14 9
Thus, inventions that
nature and natural phenomena (including products of nature).
encompass abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomenon are, in the Supreme
50
Court's view, "basic tools of scientific and technological work"" that should be "free
51
to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
The overarching belief by the Court is that this "reflects a basic judgment that
protection in such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too
severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the further spread of future
knowledge itself" 15 2 For example, under this principle, Einstein may have discovered
that anything having mass has an equivalent amount of energy, but he would not have
2
been able to patent his celebrated formula, E=mc , that shows this relationship, nor
could Newton patent his discovery of the law of gravity, nor a lay person patent his/
her discovery of a new mineral in the earth. These kinds of discoveries are
148 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.")

149 See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1293 (2012); Ass'n for

Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.

v. CLS Bank International, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
150 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).

I Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
Is2 Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548
(Breyer, J., dissenting).

U.S. 124, 128 (2006)
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"manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."15 3
35 U.S. Code §101 defines the four categories of patent eligible subject matter
as processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter,' 54 with the latter
three categories defining "things" and the first category defining "actions." 1 55 In
particular, the statute defines "process" to mean a "process, art, or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
or material."' 5 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the term "machine"
includes "every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices
to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result."'
In Chakrabarty,
the Supreme Court construed "manufacture" to mean "the production of articles for
use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery," 5 8 and the term
"composition of matter" has been held to mean "all compositions of two or more
substances and. . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical
union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or
solids."1 59
Applying the Mayo / Alice framework has caused great uncertainty and disarray
in courts, and the criticism of this framework has been rapidly growing. Not only
does Justice Thomas refuse to define "abstract," the whole framework has been
incredibly difficult in practice to implement and this has led to inconsistencies. By
way of an example, after Alice, there was a dramatic increase in the number of courts
invalidating patents under Section 101. Moreover, in the six months following Alice,
district courts invalidated well over 50 percent of patents challenged under Section
101. The Federal Circuit similarly invalidated, under Section 101, patents in six
decisions in six months.' 60
A more recent listing of patent eligibility cases that have been decided since
Bilski found only 17 out of 70 decisions found patent eligible subject matter. 16 1 in
another study, 35 U.S.C. §101 challenges have resolved early in the litigation, often

153 Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130.

14
155
156

1
158

See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2106.03 (more detailed information on the four
categories).
See 35 U.S.C. 100(b) ("The term 'process' means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of
a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.").

35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267-68 (1854).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).

159 I
160 Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet
Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. App'x. 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Univ. of Utah Res. Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Assoc., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
161 Section 101 Court Cases, BITLAW, https://www.bitlaw.com/patent/section-101-cases.html
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2019).

2019]

To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish
The Supreme Court Created Exceptions to 35 U.S. Code §101

29

1 62
In yet another study
at the pleading stage or a prompt summary judgment motion.
found that courts
authors
the
of the effect of Alice two years after the decision,
invalidated patents based on §101 motions at an average invalidation rate of 66%.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit decided 37 cases with only three of the cases being
upheld - an average invalidation rate of a staggering 92%.163 At the USPTO, one
study found that in the two years post Alice, the patent office had rejected over 36,000
published patent applications under Alice, with over 5,000 of such applications
becoming abandoned.' 64

1. "Inventive Application" and the Problem with "Significantly
More"
Under the new Mayo/Alice framework for determining patent eligibility, there
are two steps. First, one has to determine whether the claim is directed to subject
matter that the Court has deemed ineligible, namely an abstract idea, law of nature or
a natural phenomenon.' 65 Second, one is required to determine whether there is any
claim limitation other than that directed to the ineligible subject matter that is
"sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the ineligible concept itself "' 66 This contribution is called an "inventive
concept."' 67 Claim limitations that require only "well-understood, routine,
68
conventional" activity, fail to supply the necessary "inventive concept."' As such, a
claim that is directed to an abstract idea or natural law without an inventive concept
is not subject matter that is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 under current law.
The problem with this "inventive concept" and finding something "significantly
more" than the Supreme Court listed exceptions to eligible subject matter is several
fold. First, there is now a clear overlap between the patent eligibility question under
35 U.S. Code §101 and novelty under 35 U.S. Code §102. Thus, to determine what is
patent eligible, one is misled into looking for an "inventive concept" which naturally
can lead to comparing the invention to what is out there in terms of prior art to see if
it is "inventive," even though this is not permitted. This conflation of novelty with
the threshold issue of patent eligibility is not the only problem with this "inventive
concept," "significantly more," and "routine, conventional activities" analysis one is
led to perform. As the reader immediately can ascertain, the subjectivity of concepts
such as "significant," and "inventive concept" and "routine" is such that the
implementation of such a test becomes difficult and open to interpretation.
162

Jacob Koering, The Rise of the Patent-EligibiityDefense: The Absurd Abstraction of Alice, 2016
ASPATORE

163

7 (2016).

Id.

14 Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 354, 35859 (2016).
165 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l., 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168

Id. at 2359.
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In order to make the point by way of an example, under this current patent
eligibility scheme, one led to consider prior art in order to determine if the claimed
invention is "significantly more" than the patent ineligible concept, and as such, it
becomes very subjective and hard to determine what is considered "more," let along
what is considered "significant." To add to that, one is required to determine what is
"routine" or "conventional," which are equally subjective determinations that mislead
one to consider others' work to ascertain what is routine or conventional. The absence
of any clear instructions, or definitions of key terms such as what is considered
"abstract," coupled with multiple subjective determinations that now have to be
made, all lead to confusion and an incoherent implementation of this new patent
eligibility test. This has resulted in a wide disparity in the post-Alice decisions from
district court judges, admniistrative law judges and examiners at the U.S. Patent
Trademark Office alike.
Yet another problem with the current framework for determining patent
eligibility is that it does not even attempt to have objectiveness and instead
wholeheartedly embraces these subjective concepts as discussed above. If one looks
back, Congress faced a similar situation in the 1950s. Back then and before the
seminal Patent Act of 1952, patent law relied on the subjective "invention" standard
for determining patentability. Patents were routinely invalidated for lacking an
"inventive" aspect, even though there was no real definition of what makes something
"inventive."1 69 Congress then acted to remove this subjective "invention" standard
and passed the Patent Act of 1952. The intent was that the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter would be broad and that patentability would be determined on an
objective, instead of subjective, standard. This led to the codification of section 103,
where an objective standard of a person having ordinary skill in the art is used to
determine if an invention is non-obvious and therefore patentable.' 7 0 In the same 1952
Patent Act, Congress clearly moved away from the concept of "inventiveness" for the
patent eligibility analysis.1 71
As explained by the Judge Rich, who, along with P. J. Federico, was the principal
architect of the 1952 Patent Act, "Terms like 'inventive application' and 'inventive
concept' no longer have any useful place in deciding questions under the 1952 Act,
notwithstanding their universal use in cases from the 19th century and the first half
of the 20th."17 2 Thus, the Supreme Court's recent introduction into the patent
169 Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885) (invention is "the creative work
in the inventive faculty."); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) (invention is "A
substantial invention or discovery."); Potts v. Craeger, 155 U.S. 597, 608 (1895) (invention is the
"exercise of the inventive faculty."); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84,

91 (1941) (invention requires the "flash of creative genius.").
170 Judge Rader, Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, noted that "The central thrust of the 1952 Act
removed 'unmeasurable' inquiries into 'inventiveness' and instead supplied the nonobviousness

requirement of Section 103." CLS Bank Intern v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(J. Rader, concurring in part).
'' Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (Cust. & Pat. App 1979) (emphasis added).
172 Id
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§101

eligibility analysis of "inventive concept" is expressly what Congress intended not to
allow in the Patent Act of 1952.
C.

Supreme Court's Subject Matter Eligibility Framework Has Created
Profound Uncertainty in the Patent System

Somewhat telling was the fact that less than a year ago the Director of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office told the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO)
that the stakeholders in the patent system, including patent examiners, inventors,
owners and judges are presently still struggling to understand what type of subject
matter is patent eligible.' 7 3 This incoherence has been precipitated by having the
requirements for obtaining a patent overlap with the threshold issue of which subject
matter is or is not patent eligible in the first place.
Since the Alice decision in 2014, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has
issued new guidance to patent examiners for how to analyze claims under section 101
no less than five times, evidencing the level of profound uncertainty within the heart
of the government agency itself, who one would associate with having expertise in
the subject matter. One cannot fault the USPTO, as the pace of any legislative change
has been so slow that the patent office has had to educate and provide constant
guidelines to the examiner corps in an attempt to provide clarity. Yet, this has not
worked. According to a recent in 2017, there was a dramatic rise in the invalidity
rates at the USPTO based on §101 after the Supreme Court's Alice decision, as
discussed supra.
This uncertainty at the patent office resonates well outside, with practitioners
experiencing huge disparity not only from examiner to examiner on how patent
eligibility guidelines are applied, but also disparity across different technology art
groups at the USPTO. Such is the level of profound disillusionment in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on patent eligible subject matter that even the courts have been
struggling to make sense of it. There has been a staggering rise in the number of
district court § 101 invalidity decisions following the Mayo decision. As an example,
there were at most three such decisions in any year prior to the Mayo decision,
however, this increased to an average of eight § 101 invalidity decisions per year in

173

Andrei Iancu, Remarks at the Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting (Sep.
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-intellectual2018),
24,
property-owners-46th-annual-meeting.

174 For example, Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Molychem, LLC, No. 02-cv-00311, 2007 WL 3256698

(D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2007); Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. Infousa, Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 2001 (S.D. Fla.
2008), aff'd on other ground, 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
rev'd in part, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 609 F.
Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D. Mo. 2011), aff'd, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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the two years following the Mayo decision. Moreover, that number increased 10-fold
after the Alice decision.
The ultimate result is that patent examiners, inventors, practicing IP lawyers,
patent owners and even judges have struggled with the Supreme Court's subject
matter eligibility framework. Thus, what remains is a state of confusion amongst all
patent stakeholders as to what exactly makes one claim patent eligible subject matter
while another is ineligible.
1.

Judicial Exceptions under 35 U.S. Code 101 and the
Misclassification of Software as an Abstract Idea, and
Biomedical Innovations as Law of Nature or Natural
Phenomenon

In view of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on patent eligible subject
matter, in which the Court not only created exceptions to the statute but also recently
greatly expanded the scope of those exceptions, and the resultant misclassification of
software as an abstract idea, very significant effects have been felt by software-driven
and information technologies. As a result of the Supreme Court's Bilski/Mayo/A lice
patent eligibility framework, lower courts have invalidated hundreds of patents on
computer-related inventions.
For example, patent claims have been invalidated for technologies, including a
computer system of generating menus that allow users to select particular categories
and items,1 ' and a method for processing credit applications over electronic
networks.1'7 6 Generally, under this new framework, patent claims that fail to describe
solutions to a problem, or identify an "improvement in the functioning of
technology,"' 7 7 are now vulnerable under the new 35 U.S. Code § 101 framework as
not being subject matter that is even patent eligible. Yet, a small number of patents
have overcome the new high bar to what is patent eligible subject matter. As an
example, the Federal Circuit has upheld patents directed towards an e-commerce
system and method,' 8 and an information management and database system. 19
Generally, it appears that patent claims fair better if they recite discrete
structures to achieve specific results, avoiding broad functional language. However,
the infrequent occasion the Federal Circuit upholds a patent application over Alice,
fails to make Supreme Court's Alice decision remain anything but flawed. It is, for
example, a basic premise that software transforms computer systems into new
quantum states that are functionally different. That is, computer software changes a
computer system in significantly measurable and useful ways. Thus, computers
function to carry out tasks exactly because of this physical transformation of

17 Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
177 Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. Appx. 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
178 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
179 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
176
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computer systems by software. This by itself ought to be sufficient to avoid labeling
of software as merely an "abstract idea."
For example, when a software transforms a computer into a stopwatch or a Tetris
video game, the system can be described in a flow chart or printout of the code. That
description may be abstract, however, when that same software is read into and
actually "overlaid" into the operating memory of a computer system, the software's
program steps transform the quantum state of the computer system and reconfigure
the information to flow in particular patterns that are tailored to produce useful
results. Thus, software cannot be misclassified in this context as merely an abstract
idea because once it is implemented and operating in a generic computer, it at the
very least physically transforms the computer system and this can be demonstrated
by new tangible and measurable outputs from the computer. This is one of the reasons
why many have problems with Justice Thomas's refusal in Alice to define
"abstract." 180 Indeed, if Diehr remains good law, then inventions that transform or
81
reduce an article to a different state must be patent eligible.'
Thus, it is important to recognize that anything that causes a tangible physical
change and rearrangement of an article into a different state or different thing has
always been the hallmark of the patent eligibility determination. Just because in some
instances that alteration is unseen, as is the case for some software, should not mean
we have a rule that excludes from patent eligible subject matter that transformative
software.
The threshold bar of 35 U.S. Code section 101 ought not to be the place a
software-driven invention fails because the subject matter is ineligible subject matter;
instead, such claims should be found patent eligible subject matter and then later
analyzed under other statutory provisions of the Patent Act. This is also a position
that Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman has held, where she has repeatedly stated
in her opinions that section 101 is intended to be a low threshold so that it does not
prevent innovation from flourishing.' 82
Since the Alice decision, patent claims that have included software have faced a
much higher barrier for receiving patents than other fields. Unfortunately, this has

180 Justice Thomas declined to provide a working definition for "abstract." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357

(2014).
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the "abstract
ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful
distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of
intermediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of
"abstract ideas" as we have used that term. Id
181 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981) (holding that "patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g. transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the
requirements of § 101.").

i82 See Alice, 717 F.3d 1269, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (arguing that section 101 should be a lower
threshold).
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stymied the development of specialized software, such as artificial intelligence. The
practical results of which have been that innovation goes where it has the best chance
to grow. For example, it should be a warning to law and policy makers that Chinese
artificial intelligence start-ups are now, three years after the Supreme Court's Alice
decision, receiving more funding than U.S. artificial intelligence start-ups. According
to a 2018 MIT Technology Review, of the $15.2 billion invested in artificial
intelligence startups globally in 2017, 48 percent went to China and just 38 percent
to America. The US is starting to lose out in capital investments in software driven
industries, such as artificial intelligence, evidenced by the fact that the U.S. accounted
for 77 percent of this investment in 2013, but that has fallen to 50 percent in 2017. 83
Since Alice, patent examiners have presumptively classified many software
claims as patent ineligible subject matter on the reasoning that they are abstract ideas,
under the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, in order to
just pass this first hurdle, which traditionally has been a low bar, now applicants must
show why their claimed invention is "somethingmore" than just a mere abstract idea.
This new subjective paradigm, created in Alice, has resulted in an all-out attack on
software patent claims.
Similarly to the misclassification of software as abstract ideas, the wholesale
misclassification of certain biomedical inventions as "laws of nature," or "products
of nature," is misplaced. For example, to take the analogy from the discussion of
computers and software above, one can think of the human body as the computer.
Thus, our bodies are like a physical system that will react differently when, for
example, we eat or take medication. Although we may be similar, we are not all the
same in how we react to these types of stimuli. These stimuli, be they food intake or
drug ingestion for example, physically transform our bodies and our bodies react to
that to give an output (we eat, our stomachs are transformed and send a message to
our brains to let us know to feel less hungry; or we are in pain, take medication and
this transforms our bodies to a different state where less pain is felt). This
transformation is all that ought to be necessary to surmount the low threshold bar that
Congress has intended section 101 to be when assessing if a subject matter is patent
eligible or not.
The Supreme Court's patent eligibility trio cases, Mayo/Myriad/Alice, decided
in as many years earlier this decade has also had profound effects on these biomedical
advances. As a direct result of the Mayo decision, discussed supra, diagnostic
methods that use biomarkers to predict the likelihood of a future disease, as well as
diagnostic methods that measure that biomarker, are now largely unable to surmount
to new Supreme Court created high threshold bar to what is patent eligible subject
matter. One year after this Mayo decision, came Myriad. In view of Myriad, claims
to any isolated substance from the body, including genes, proteins, and even cell lines,
183

Jackie Snow, China'sAl Startups ScoredMore Fundingthan America's Last Year, MIT TECH. REV.
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/610271/chinas-ai-startups-scored-morefunding-than-americas-last-year/.
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are now facing stiff threshold challenges to whether those discoveries and inventions
are patent eligible subject matter under the new patent eligibility scheme, albeit
altering genes and other naturally derived substances is more likely to overcome the
new 35 U.S.C. §101 threshold. 18 4
A prime example of how this Mayo/Myriad/Alice trilogy of cases is affecting
Biotechnology and the development of new medically-focused technologies can be
found in the Ariosa case.' 85 This case is being widely discussed presently within the
patent community. The technology involved a new non-invasive pre-natal diagnostic
method for determining the gender, blood type, and other characteristics of a fetus,
including if the fetus has a genetic disorder that would cause conditions such as
Down's Syndrome.' 86 While the currently existing technology involved inserting a
needle into the fetus itself, potentially harming the fetus and the pregnancy, the new
technology in Ariosa was the discovery, using existing PCR technology, of a fetal
DNA marker in the amniotic fluid of a pregnant woman. This discovery led to a new
method for non-invasively diagnosing genetic characteristics of unborn children in a
safer manner compared to currently existing technologies.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that the only discovery that the
inventors had made was to find cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal plasma,
and that thereafter, the inventors just used known laboratory techniques to implement
a method for detecting DNA material and determining fetal characteristics. Thus, the
Federal Circuit in Ariosa held the claimed method "begins and ends with a natural
phenomenon,"' 87 concluding that the first step of the Mayo/Alice test is met because
88
the patent claim is "directed to matter that is naturally occurring"' and therefore this
was patent ineligible subject matter. Next, the Court analyzed the claim considering
"the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to
determine whether additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a
patent-eligible application."' 89
Despite the presence of claims to particular method steps, the court concluded
that the claims were insufficient to integrate the naturally occurring material into a
patent-eligible application because the steps were "routine, conventional activities,"
particularly since the patent application itself indicated that those particular method

1

Hallie Wimberly, Comment, The Changing Landscape of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility and Its
Impact on BiotechnologicalInnovation, 54. Hous. L. Rev. 995, 1006-07 (2017).

115

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

186 Id. at 1373, 81. (Sequenom was the exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540. Claim 1 of that
patent recited: "1. A method for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin performed
on a maternal serum or plasma sample from a pregnant female, which method comprises amplifying
a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample and detecting the presence of a
paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample.").
187 Id. at 1376.
188 Id.

189 Id. at 1375. (emphasis added).
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steps, such as amplification, detection, and correlation, could be done using "standard
techniques."' 90 The Federal Circuit then cited Mayo: "appending routine,
conventional steps to a natural phenomenon, specified at a high level of generality, is
not enough to supply an inventive concept. Where claims of a method patent are
directed to an application that starts and ends with a naturally occurring phenomenon,
the patent fails to disclose patent eligible subject matter if the methods themselves
are conventional, routine and well understood applications in the art." 191 Thus, the
patent claims were found to be invalid as ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C.

§101.
Tragically, this same invention has been found to be patent eligible subject
matter by the highest court in the UK in late 2017 and by the highest court in Australia
in August 2019. As Judge Linn of the Federal Circuit stated, he saw "no reason, in
policy or statute. .. why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent
ineligible." The practical result of this misguided current Supreme Court jurisprudent
on 35 U.S. Code §101 has been that the U.S. innovation-focused economy has been
harmed and is increasingly becoming negative in outlook.
V. Negative Effect on the U.S. Innovation Economy
According to an in-depth recent study, as a direct result of the difference between
U.S. law and the law of other industrialized nations on the issue of what is and what
is not patent eligible subject matter, technological development
and
commercialization in the U.S. has been stymied when compared to the same
technologies being developed and commercialized in other developed countries,
including in Europe and in China.1 92 In their recent article titled "How Patent
Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation," the authors
examined U.S. patent applications that received section 101 patent ineligibility
rejections. The study then compares that same technology to see if it was also rejected
as patent ineligible subject matter in Europe or in China.
The results are staggering: over 1700 U.S. patent applications spanning multiple
technologies, including everything from drugs and therapeutics, molecular biology,
combinatorial chemistry databases, control systems, immunology, microbiology,
telecommunications, artificial intelligence, vehicle navigation, data processing,
cleaning compositions and information security to name a few, were all found to be
ineligible subject matter for patenting in the U.S. under the currently expansive
Supreme Court patent ineligibility regime. And yet, those same technologies were all
found to be patent eligible subject matter in both the European Union and in China.' 93

190

Id

191

Id

at 1377-78.

192 Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead- How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is
UnderminingU.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REv. 939, 955 (2017).
193

See Id at 941-42. (reporting that about 1,700 patent applications covering the same inventions were
rejected as patent ineligible subject matter in the U.S., and yet were considered eligible in both China
and the European Union). Abandoned U.S. patent applications included in fields such as (number of
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Many patent stakeholders have recognized this negative effect of current patent
eligibility jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, and as Senator Coons stated on record
recently, "Today, U.S. patent law discourages innovation in some of the most critical
areas of technology, including artificial intelligence, medical diagnostics, and
personalized medicine."194 To give an example to Senator Coons' statement, it is
generally accepted in the medical community that a diagnosis of a disease occurs
before treatments and cures can be developed. As such, new innovative medical
devices typically trail discovery of new diagnostic tests by about a decade.1 95 Thus,
since the new Supreme Court-promulgated patent eligibility jurisprudence has
severely impeded the development and commercialization of new medical
diagnostics, it stands given that far fewer medical devices will also be forthcoming in
the decade to come. This is yet another negative way the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on this patent eligibility question has affected technological innovation
and commercialization in the U.S.
In short, although the U.S. Constitution requires Congress to promote
innovation,'96 the Supreme Court has sadly raised the threshold by unilaterally
deciding, without any support from the statutory language, what subject matter is
worthy of a patent. Supreme Court's interpretation is not only contrary to statutory
language and intent and quite the opposite of what the U.S. constitution demands, but
it is having a real measurable negative effect on the development of new technologies
and innovations in the U.S.

applications in each field shown in parentheses): Drug and Therapeutics (474); Molecular Biology
and Microbiology (356); Amusement Devices (245); Combinatorial Chemistry (238); Measuring

and Testing (83); Databases (80); Multicellular Living Organisms (38); Structural Design (35);
Control Systems (21); Business Methods (18); Surgery (17); Chemistry (15); Immunology (15);

Computer Graphics (14); Food Or Edible Materials (11); Agriculture (10); User Interfaces (9);
Organic Compounds (8); Data Processing (5); Artificial Intelligence (3); Education And
(2);
Communications
Vehicle Navigation (3);
Electrolysis (3);
Demonstration (3);
Telecommunications (2); Coatings (2); Information Security (2); Cleaning & Compositions (2);
Electro-Chemistry; (2) Marine Propulsion (1); Resins And Rubbers (1); Refrigeration (1);

Compositions: Ceramic (1); Video Recording (1); Mineral Oils (1); Radiation Imagery (1); Dentistry
(1); Registers (1); Image Analysis (1); Chemical Disinfecting (1); Digital Communications (1); Fluid

9

Sprinkling (1); Power Plants (1); Radiant Energy (1); Error Detection (1); Adhesives (1);
Evaporators (1).
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https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-and-reps-collins-johnsonand-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework.

i95 Bilski v. Doll, 2009 WL 2441060 (U.S.), 7 (U.S.,2009).
196

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution recites "promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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Damage to U.S. Innovation and U.S. Economic Competitiveness
Caused by the Misapplication of the Alice/Mayo Test

The Supreme Court's Mayo/Alice framework for patent eligibility has now had
time to show its effect. Few would argue that its effect has been anything but highly
disruptive and destructive in a negative way so far as new technology development
and commercialization are concerned. As an example, the Licensing Executives
Society, a leading association for intellectual property, technology, and business
development professionals, submitted comments this year to Undersecretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Andre Iancu. In their statement, like many others in similar tune, they highlight
recent Supreme Court precedent relating to patent eligibility and acknowledged that
the existing framework for assessing eligibility has proven unduly difficult to
implement in a consistent manner and has produced much uncertainty. They go on to
state that this uncertainty has made it difficult for inventors, businesses and other
stakeholders to predict what constitutes patent eligible subject matter, and to plan and
invest accordingly.
Moreover, an interesting study from earlier this year focused on the fundamental
question of whether the Supreme Court's new patent eligibility legal framework as
outlined in Mayo/Myriad/Alice actually impacted decisions to invest in new
technology development and commercialization. 197 Based on a survey of 475 venture
capital and private equity investors to study the impact of the Court's eligibility cases
on their firms' decisions to invest in companies developing technology, this study
found that investors overwhelmingly believe patent eligibility is an important
consideration when their firms decide whether to invest in companies developing
technology, with 74% of investors agreeing that it is a key reason to invest or not to
invest and 14% disagreeing. These results are in tune with the notion that patents are
an absolutely integral part of capital investment decisions being made to develop
newly emerging innovative technologies.
Moreover, investors view patent eligibility as affecting different industries to
different levels and factor this into their capital investment decisions. For example,
whereas the new patent eligibility laws would minimally impact decisions to invest
capital in construction related technologies, the new changes make a huge impact for
these venture capital and private equity firms when they view a potential investment
opportunity in biotechnology, medical device and pharmaceutical industries. 198
The investors have been turning away from investing in certain innovationfocused industries, such as Biotechnology and Software-driven innovations, as a
direct result of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on this issue. In particular, about
200 venture capital and private equity investors indicated that the Supreme Court's

197 David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibilityand Investment,
198

CARDOZO L. REv., (forthcoming 2019); SMU
Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 414. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340937.
Id at 9.
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recent patent eligibility laws had somewhat negative or very negative effects on their
firm's existing investments, while only about 15% of these investors reported
99
33% of investors who focus on
somewhat positive or very positive effects.1
technologies reported that the new patent eligibility laws impacted their firms'
investment behavior, with these investors reporting that they shifted their capital
investments away from companies that were developing new software or new
technology related to biotechnology, medical device, and pharmaceutical
industries. 200 This 2019 report adds to the data emerging regarding how the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on patent eligibility are harming the innovation economy in
the U.S.
It is clear from their statement and other similar statements made by no less than
the current acting Director of the USPTO that this Mayo/Myriad/Alice test is
damaging technological innovation and economic competitiveness by giving very
significant reason to pause for decision makers wishing to take risks and invest to
develop new emerging technologies, fearful of the fact that the Mayo/Myriad/Alice
framework is a sign of weak patent protection.
B.

Effect on the Biopharmaceutical and Software Industries
1.

Invalidation ofPatents Under the Expansive Section 101 Regime
Harms Patients andIncreases Costs

Since the Alice decision, patent claims that have included software have faced a
much higher barrier for receiving patents than other fields. Unfortunately, this has
stymied the development of specialized software, such as artificial intelligence (Al).
The practical results of which have been that innovation goes where it has the best
chance to grow. For example, it should be warning to law and policy makers that
Chinese Al start-ups are now, three years after the Supreme Court's Alice decision,
receiving more funding than U.S. Al start-ups. According to a review published in
2018 by MIT Technology Review, of the $15.2 billion invested in AI startups
globally in 2017, 48 percent went to China and just 38 percent to America. The US
is starting to lose out in capital investments in software driven industries, such as
artificial intelligence, highlighted by the fact that while the U.S. accounted for 77
percent of such investment before the Alice decision, that investment fell to 50 percent
three years after the Alice decision.
In another recent study, published in 2019, surveying close to 500 venture capital
and private equity firms about how their investment decisions in new technologies
changed since the new Supreme Court created patent eligibility laws came into effect,
has provided critical data for an evidence-based evaluation of how the havoc caused

199 Jason Rantanen, Guest Post on Patent Eligibility and Investment: A Survey, PATENTLYO BLOG
(March 6, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/patent-eligibility-investment.html.
200
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by the Supreme Court has affected investments in new technology development.20 1
Professor Taylor makes a compelling evidence-based argument, highlighting the
negative impact of the Supreme Court's recent patent eligibility cases, namely Mayo!
Myriad/Alice, has had on capital investment, and especially so on investment
decisions being made on emerging innovative new technologies in the biotechnology,
medical device, and pharmaceutical industries. The study points out that these
medicine related technologies, even though they are the most impactful in terms of
public health, are the most impacted by reduced investments in these industries
directly because of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on patent eligibility. The
study also makes a point to highlight that their empirical results show that the
Supreme Court's recent patent eligibility decisions have negatively impacted each
and every area of technological development studied. 202
As a consequence, the results support the idea that the time has come for
Congress to at least consider overturning the Supreme Court's new eligibility
standard to prevent additional lost investment in technological development in the
United States. Indeed, given the results of at least the two recent comprehensive
surveys outlined above, it seems likely that the Supreme Court's eligibility decisions
have resulted in lost investment in the life sciences that has delayed or altogether
prevented the development of medicines and medical procedures. That coupled with
China taking market share from the U.S. in emerging new technologies such as
artificial intelligence should give pause for lawmakers to turn their attention to this
pressing issue.
VI. Congress Should Abolish the Non-Statutory Exceptions to Patent
Eligibility Laws
The Supreme Court has decided eight cases in the last forty years concerning the
patent eligibility issue, far more than on any other patent law doctrine. It is somewhat
telling that four of those eight cases have been decided in the past eight years. And
yet, even after multiple attempts to do so, the Supreme Court has been unable to
provide a workable standard that comports with the legislative framework. If
anything, as discussed supra, the current status of how the Supreme Court views the
law on patent eligibility is directly inconsistent with statutory language and intent and
simply has proved to be unworkable, causing havoc in industries focused on
technological innovation.
Patent office examiners, faced with no less than five sets of very detailed
guidelines in as many years being issued by the USPTO in view of the ever changing

O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, CARDOzo L. REv. (forthcoming 2019); SMU
Dedman
School
of
Law
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
414,
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=076096124100086117074105080088099089121045
0610780280620230710850750021170641060831100390540981011050440271131181170880990
8408401002504603805208801612311912511110812706206903909100812302600711102712302
4094087002113108026004004127029069026023006066123088&EXT=pdf.
Id. at 11.
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legal landscape on patent eligibility and the sever uncertainty regarding patent
eligibility laws, are reminded even in the guidelines issued in 2019 that 35 U.S.C.
§101 is not the sole tool for determining patentability, and that 35 U.S.C. §112 , 35
U.S.C. §102, and 35 U.S.C. §103 will provide additional tools for ensuring that the
claim meets the conditions for patentability. The Supreme Court has similarly made
this clear in Bilski:
The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a thresholdtest. Even if
an invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act's protection
the claimed invention must also satisfy "the conditions and
requirements of this title." § 101. Those requirements include that the
invention be novel, see §102, nonobvious, see § 103, and fully and
particularly described, see §112.203
Yet, the Supreme Court also foresaw the possibility of ensuing mayhem on the
wider patent bar and courts using section 101 not as a low hurdle threshold test, but
as a lethal dispositive weapon in patent law matters. Thus, the Supreme Court advised
the lower courts in Alice to "tread carefully in construing this exclusionaryprinciple
lest it swallow all of patent law"2 04 and in further warning two years prior in Mayo
that its own judicially created exceptions to the statute have the power to destroy
Congress' patent law, stating: "The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
205
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas."
One key problem with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this issue is that
when coming up with their Mayo/Alice framework for determining the contours of
their own created exceptions to the explicit language of the 35 U.S. Code § 101 statute,
neither of the Mayo nor Alice decisions addressed the legislative history of 35 U.S.
2 06
Code § 101, nor the legislative text or history of the 1952 Patent Act.
Now that nine years have passed since the Bilski decision in 2010, including
three other Supreme Court cases on patent eligible subject matter, namely Mayo in
2012, Myriad in 2013 and Alice in 2014, that have actually expanded the reach of the
"exclusionary principle test", we are exactly where the Supreme Court warned we
could be: that is, the Supreme Court created judicial exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101
have all but "swallowed all of patent law," and "eviscerated patent law" as the Court
itself warned in both Mayo and Alice.

203
204
205
206

See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. V. CLS Bank International, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
See Brief for Petitioner at 26-28, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 2511 (2016)
(No. 15-1182), 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4087.
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Faced with daunting uncertainty in this area of patent law, the lower courts and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have used these Supreme Court decisions,
especially the Mayo and Alice decisions, to strike down and invalidate hundreds of
U.S. patents which, as discussed supra, has damaged technological innovation and
commercialization in America.
A.

Back to Basics: Patenting a Law of Nature, Natural Phenomenon, or
Abstract Ideas are Prevented by Existing Explicit Statutory
Patentability Requirements

The large number of precedential decisions from both the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit, interpreting and applying 35 U.S.C. § 101 in recent years has
created a maw of patent eligibility rulings that have restricted the ability to patent
certain technologies and created great inconsistency and uncertainty in the patent
system. This is no less reflected by the fact that the Supreme Court has already heard
four patent eligibility cases in this decade, namely Bilski in 2010, Mayo in 2012,
Myriad in 2013, and Alice in 2014, and two more - Vanda and Berkheimer - are
currently pending certiorari with the Supreme Court inviting the Solicitor General's
view. This has all contributed to a harder environment for obtaining a patent,
especially since the threshold bar to assessing whether a subject matter is even patent
eligible has been fundamentally raised.
One argument, led by several large technology companies, those with small
patent portfolios, has been that patents impede progress and innovation and that
protection by way of owning a large number of patents is not necessarily a sign of
quality and gets in the way of others innovating. While some aspects of this argument
resonate, namely that having large numbers of low-quality patents is
counterproductive, the means by which the Supreme Court has set out to reign in
patent law, starting especially mainly in 2012 with its Mayo decision, has caused
disarray and been counterproductive. It has even reached the point where last year the
Supreme Court decided that a U.S. patent was merely a "public franchise"207, which
shocked observers because such a government franchise can technically be
withdrawn at any time.
While the judicial exceptions to 35 U.S.C. § 101 have had the effect of making
it much harder for certain inventions to be prosecuted towards an allowance at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and while these judicial exceptions are aligned
with the policy of having a smaller number of high quality patents as suppose to many
weak patents, the tool with which the Supreme Court has done this, namely 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, has had unintended consequences on technological innovation across multiple
industries. This has been especially felt in the Biotechnology and Software industries
in America.
This Supreme Court created uncertainty in the patent eligibility law has had real-

207

See Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, et al., 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018).
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world practical consequences, including for example, the highly regarded Cleveland
Clinic and other major public and private research and development focused
institutions beginning to refrain from researching and developing certain types of
20 8
Further, no patent
innovative technologies because they cannot be patented.
protection also means investors are unwilling to provide the capital necessary to
develop basic innovative research and turn research into developed medical
diagnostics and software-driven technologies that can be deployed in hospitals and
laboratories. 20 9
Thus, the Supreme Court was misguided to create this uncertainty in patent laws
and use the Patent Act's 35 U.S.C. §101 to do so. If the goal has been to not allow
patents for laws of nature, natural phenomenon or abstract ideas, the Supreme Court
should have refrained from creating exceptions to patent eligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101 in their three back-to-back cases starting in 2012 with Mayo. Instead,
the focus should have remained on other statutory language from the Patent Act,
namely existing statutes 35 U.S.C. §102 (requirement for the invention to be new),
35 U.S.C. §103 (requirement for the invention to be nonobvious) and 35 U.S.C. §112
(requirement for a detailed description of the invention) to evaluate patent claims at
issue. 21 0 Indeed, this article advances the position that this strategy would simplify
the subject matter eligibility analysis for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
courts, patent owners, practitioners and the public alike by prohibiting any
determination of "inventiveness"2 and patentability issues under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103, and 112 from the § 101 analysis.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made this clear: "The §101 patent-eligibility
inquiry is only a thresholdtest. Even if an invention qualifies as a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act's protection,
the claimed invention must also satisfy "the conditions and requirements of this
title." Those requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious,
see § 103, and fully and particularly described, see § 112."212
Interestingly, in Mayo, the U.S. government had argued that virtually any step
beyond a statement of law of nature itself should transform an unpatentable law of
nature into a potentially patentable claim and this ought to be sufficient to satisfy
§ 101. That is, the bar for what is and is not eligible subject matter should be set low.
The government's view was that any potentially invalid patent claims would not be
able to pass the other hurdles found in other statutes of the Patent Act. The U.S.
government in their Amicus brief to the Court urged the Supreme Court not to depart
208 Brenden Gingrich, Simone Ward, Cleveland Clinic II: Has the Federal Circuit Undermined Patent

JDSupra (May 9,
Office Guidance and Eliminated an Important Tool for Patenting Diagnostics?,
2 34 2
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cleveland-clinic-ii-has-the-federal209

d.

210 (emphasis added).
21 Or "Inventive Concept" as is required under the Mayo/Alice framework.

212 See Bilski 561 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
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so far from the statutory language and to ultimately keep a low threshold bar for
determining what subject matter is even patent eligible and then leaving the higher
bars to patentability on other parts of the Patent Act best suited for that task, namely
novelty under §102 and obviousness under § 103.
This is a position this article agrees with, yet I take one more step and suggest
Congress should abolish all three of the Supreme Court created exceptions to the
explicit statutory language under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the judicially-created
exceptions run directly in opposition to both the statute and its legislative history, as
discussed supra.
Yet, in 2012, in its Mayo decision, the Supreme Court explained that the
approach urged by the U.S. government would make the "law of nature" exception
to §101 a "dead letter" and is not consistent with Bilski, Diehr, Flook, and Benson.
That is, even though, with the exception of the Chakrabartycase, the Supreme Court
has hardly ever discussed the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. §101,213 the Court
backed its more radical, activist current jurisprudence on 35 U.S.C. §101, especially
in Mayo, by merely referencing its own prior, much less radical, older cases to
effectively back its own parallel law alongside the 35 U.S.C. §101 patent eligibility
statute. Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in Mayo, refused what
he called "the Government's invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries
for the better established inquiry under §101." The Court resisted calls by the
government in Mayo to heavily reduce the influence of §101 and rely more on the
traditional patent-eligibility inquiry under §§ 102, 103, and 112. In the Court's view,
articulated in Mayo, shifting the inquiry more on the other provisions of the Patent
Act "risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those
sections can do work that they are not equipped to do." 1 4
However, many patent scholars, including myself, disagree. 35 U.S.C. §101 is
not the "better established inquiry." As the Supreme Court itself has stated in Bilski,
"The §101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test."2 15 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the court in Diehr, even explained that considering novelty under Section
101 was wholly inappropriate (the new test requires under Section 101 requires an
"inventive concept").2 16 Academic positions and inconsistency aside, now that seven
years have passed since the radical Mayo decision, the results are self-evident and

213

See Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). Although the Supreme Court in Chakrabartyrefers to
the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. §101, it is only limited to interpreting the word "manufacture"
and "composition of matter" since this case related to a modified bacterium that could process and

break down hydrocarbons.

214 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66,90 (2012).
215 See Bilski 561 U.S. at 602: "The §101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if an
invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, in order to receive
the Patent Act's protection, the claimed invention must also satisfy 'the conditions and requirements
of this title." § 101. Those requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious,
216

see § 103, and fully and particularly described, see § 112." (emphasis added).
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-189 (1981).
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point to uncertainty in this area of patent law and this has harmed technological
innovation and new technology development and commercialization in the U.S.17
Sadly, Mayo has resulted in patent stakeholders thinking about other statutory
categories of novelty, non-obviousness and even description of the technology, all
under the 35 U.S.C. §101 patent eligibility analysis. This has the effect of greatly
elevating the importance of 35 U.S.C. §101, while making the other traditionally
more stringent statutory requirements of the Patent Act superfluous.
Another problem of the current Mayo/Alice patent eligibility test is that it by
elevating the threshold hurdle of what is patent eligible subject matter so high and
contrary to the statute, potentially newly emerging breakthrough technologies fail at
this preliminary threshold step, without even having any kind of substantive
determination of the technology in view of a single prior art reference or what others
have done to render any such breakthrough obvious. Also, the current Mayo/Alice
patent eligibility framework does not factor in claim construction to any great level.
This is even though such claim construction, including using intrinsic evidence from
the specification and extrinsic evidence from treatises and experts, is a key feature of
a patentability analysis.
If the Supreme Court were adamant to continue its judicial exceptions to 35
U.S.C. §101 jurisprudence, a potential way forward would be for the Supreme Court
to go back to the law of patent eligibility that existed before it unilaterally expanded
the scope of patent ineligible subject matter in its Mayo/Myriad/Alice trilogy of cases.
Currently pending opportunities include granting certiorari in pending litigations
2 20
19
such as in Berkheimer,2 18 Vanda,2 and Athena Diagnostics. It remains to be seen
what transpires next, albeit it is interesting that the Supreme Court has this time
invited the Solicitor General to submit a brief in both Berkheimer and in Vanda, and
217 Taylor, David
218

O., Patent Eligibility andInvestment, CARDOzo

L. REv. (forthcoming).

Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (this case is viewed by some patent

professionals to be the most consequential development in patent eligibility since the Supreme Court
introduced its two-part eligibility framework in Mayo and Alice. Alice and Mayo caused lower courts
to invalidate thousands of claims from hundreds of patents for failure to claim patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. @ 101. Berkheimer tempers the impact of Alice and Mayo on procedural
grounds and may insulate patent claims from § 101 challenges.
219 Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. (This case focused on a situation
where the implementing the step of method of treatment was straightforward, however, the question
remained if the method was patent eligible subject matter. Amici Curiae briefs from both the
Intellectual Property and Innovation Professors and The Association for Accessible Medicines

("AAM") focused on this issue, that Vanda conflicts with Mayo and Flook. The Professors' brief
states: "The Federal Circuit's decision effectively overturns this Court's precedents, thwarts the
proper development of patent eligibility law, and will lead to countless improperly issued patents.")
220

Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed Cir. 2019). Here,
the Federal Circuit issued an opinion this year, holding that Athena's medical diagnostic methods
were directed toward laws of nature and thus patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The inventors
had discovered that about 20% of patients with the neurological disorder myasthenia gravis (MG)
generate autoantibodies to a membrane protein called MuSK. The asserted patent claims recited

steps to detect autoantibodies that bind to MuSK.
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for Athena Diagnostics, a petition for certiorariis expected to be filed within weeks.
B.

Harmonizing U.S. Patent Laws with Other Industrialized Nations

To add to the notion that the time is ripe for the U.S. Congress to act to reign in
the caustic harm that the judicially created exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101 are causing
to U.S. businesses and position on the global innovation landscape, one can review
how other industrialized countries patent laws are addressing or have previously
addressed similar situations. To make this point, I focus on just one recent example
and examine how the same technology is being treated by patent laws of other
industrialized nations, specifically concerning patent eligibility laws of the U.S., the
United Kingdom and Australia.
As recent as in August of 2019, the Australia's High Court decided that a
discovery that there are cell free fragments in a pregnant woman's blood that contain
a detectable level of cell-free fetal DNA and that this can be used to determine fetal
abnormalities, such as Down Syndrome, in a non-invasive manner is patent eligible
subject matter. This exact same discovery, involving the same litigants, has been
determined not to be patent eligible subject matter in the U.S. because the invention
falls under the U.S. judicially created exception to 35 U.S.C. §101 for being
"naturally-occurring" subject matter.2 2 ' Moreover, the High Court of Justice in the
United Kingdom recently also heard this same issue, involving the same legal issue
and technology.2 2 2 There, in 2017, Justice Henry Carr of the UK High Court, similar
to Justice Beach's August 2019 decision from Australia's High Court, found that such
a patent claim is patent eligible subject matter22 3 , thereby even further contrasting the
U.S. position to that of both the U.K. and Australia's highest courts on the same legal
issue involving the same technology.
The particular technology and legal issue in the above-referenced example
concerned whether the discovery that there are fragments of fetal DNA in the blood
a pregnant woman and that this can be used to provide a non-invasive way to
determine fetal characteristics was patent eligible subject matter or not. The U.S.
position has been that this is patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101
because the presence of the cell free fragments of fetal DNA in maternal blood was a
naturalphenomenon and the claims did not contain an inventive concept sufficient to

221 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed Cir. 2015).
222 Illumina, Inc v. Premaitha Health Plc [2017] EWHC 2930 (Pat) (Eng.).
223 Id. Justice Henry Carr of the High Court of Justice in Great Britain wrote in Illumina
"I do not accept
that, properly construed, claim 1 is a claim to a discovery as such. The claims are not directed to
information about the natural world, but rather to a practical process, namely a 'detection method'
which uses information about the natural world. Claim 1 is directed to the detection of foetal DNA
in a sample of plasma or serum. Such samples do not exist in the natural world and must be

artificially created. The claimed method of detection is also an artificial process which does not exist
in the natural world. The claim is to a practical process of implementing a discovery, for practical

applications. The actual contribution, as a matter of substance, does not fall solely within the
excluded subject matter and is technical in nature."

To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish

2019]

47

The Supreme Court Created Exceptions to 35 U.S. Code §101

2 4
"transform" the natural phenomenon into a patent eligible subject matterz The test
itself has applications of great value, namely it is an improved technique that does not
require taking fetal or placental samples for screening for chromosomal abnormalities
that could affect a baby's health and development, such as trisomy 21 (Down
syndrome), sex chromosome aneuploidies (SCAs, abnormal numbers of X or Y
chromosomes), determining the gender of a baby and the like.

The patents at issue here included U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 B1 (the '540
patent), entitled: "Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis", and counterpart European Patent
No. 0994963 B1 (the '963 patent) and Australian Patent No. 727919 B2 (the '919
patent). Since the commercial potential for the pre-natal diagnostic market is
enormous, patent litigation ensued between the innovator and copycats in this same
technology in several international jurisdictions, including the U.S., Great Britain,
and Australia.
The consistency between Australia's highest court's recent decision in August
2019 and the UK's highest court's decision in November 2017 on this same legal
issue involving the same technology, finding the technology to be patent eligible
subject matter in both UK and AU, further contrasts current U.S. law and puts the
U.S. position directly at odds with positions taken on the same issue by other
industrialized nations with well-developed legal systems. This complete difference
of law between the U.S. and other developed nations on patent eligible subject matter
has had practical negative results for the U.S. and not just in the biomedical field, as
evidenced by a recent study analyzing in detail, technological sector by sector, how
the patent eligibility laws in the U.S. have undermined its leadership role in
225

innovation.

As Judge Randall Rader, recently retired former Chief Judge at the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted recently, "Frankly, there is no country in the
224 Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1376, 1378. Here, a U.S. patent governing a method of detecting fetal DNA
in the pregnant mother's serum was found to be directed to patent ineligible laws of nature and
natural phenomenon, and thus the patent was deemed to be invalid. The Federal Circuit decided that
the patent claims were generally directed to detecting the presence of a naturally occurring thing or
a natural phenomenon, cell-free fetal DNA in matemal blood. Moreover, the Federal Circuit found
that the other elements of the claim, including using PCR to amplify the DNA from blood, did not
transform the ineligible patent claim into a patent-eligible application of the natural phenomenon,
with the reason being that those additional elements were well-understood, conventional activities.
225 See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, TURNING GOLD INTO LEAD: How PATENT ELIGIBILITY
DOCTRINE 1S UNDERMINING U.S. LEADERSHIP IN INNOVATION, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 956
(2017) (reporting that over 1,600 patent applications covering the same inventions were rejected as
patent ineligible subject matter in the U.S., and yet were considered eligible in either China or the
European Union or both). Abandoned U.S. patent applications included in fields such as (number of
applications in each field shown in parentheses): Drug and Therapeutics (474); Molecular Biology

and Microbiology (356); Amusement Devices (245); Combinatorial Chemistry (238); Measuring
and Testing (83); Databases (80); Multicellular Living Organisms (38); Structural Design (35);
Control Systems (21); Business Methods (18); Surgery (17); Chemistry (15); Immunology (15);
Computer Graphics (14); and others.
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world that does what we do here. We have once again, set ourselves on a course which
is out of harmony with the rest of the world's intellectual property standards." 226
C.

Signs of Hope: Congress's Willingness to Revisit 35 U.S.C. §101 and
Available Legislative Options

As a result of the very negative impact on U.S. private and public enterprises
conducting biomedical research with the aim of commercializing their innovations
and the wider negative impact on the Biotechnology industry in the U.S. at large,
there have been recent proposals to legislate and change the laws governing patent
eligible subject matter. The aim of the lawmakers is to encourage innovators to again
take risks and pursue their ideas, knowing that U.S. patent laws will be on their side
in their efforts to commercialize and bring new technologies to the U.S. marketplace.
As of Fall, 2019, such change is currently being considered by the U.S.
Congress. Indicating that this may be forthcoming, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)
recently gave a speech at a conference entitled, "The Supreme Court's Section 101
Jurisprudence: Dangers for the Innovation Economy." Senator Coons said that
subject matter eligibility is "an area where the jurisprudence is insufficiently clear,
and which may necessitate congressional action to provide clarity and consistency."
Indeed, on April 18, 2019, Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE),
along with Representatives Doug Collins (R-GA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), and Steve
Stivers (R-OH), released a bipartisan framework for 35 U.S.C. § 101 reform, where
they outlined specific goals that lawmakers should address.227
Fast forward to now, Fall of 2019, a group of Senators and House of
Representatives are currently considering fixing the Supreme Court created patent
eligibility problem, especially since the Federal Circuit has been unable or unwilling
to define the contours of what is and is not patent eligible subject matter in view of
the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on the issue 2 2 8 These closed-door
226 Eli Mazour, The Most Interesting Man in the Patent World Fights to Improve America's Patent
System, IP WATCHDOG (September 19, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/19/mostinteresting-man-patent-world/id=87983/.
227

Senators Chris Coons, Thom Tillis, and Representatives Doug Collins, Hank Johnson, and Steve
Stivers, Draft Outline of Section 101 Reform, https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/3491a23f-

09c3-4f4a-9a93-71292704c5b1; Tryn T. Stimart and Jean E. Dassie, Legislators Propose
Framework To Reform Patent Eligibility Under Section 101 (July 22, 2019) (attributing authorship
of
draft
reform)
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/827762/Patent/Legislators+Propose+Framework+To+Refo
rm+Patent+Eligibility+Under+Section+101.
228

Gene Quinn, America's Patent System Favors the Few and InhibitsInnovation-But Change Could
Be Coming (March 28, 2019) https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/03/28/americas-patent-systemfavors-the-few-inhibits-innovation-but-change-could-be-coming/id=107807/ (As of Summer 2019,
Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), Congressman Doug Collins (R-GA) and

Congressman Hank Johnson (D-GA) currently have a four-principle framework for legislatively
fixing patent eligibility laws. Their framework recites: "Guiding Principles for Section 101 Reform.
1. Patent eligibility should not turn on the existence of related technology or the current state of the
art. In other words, subject to meeting all other requirements of the patent statute, especially novelty,
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roundtable talks between lawmakers seek to come up with legislative language, and
it is anticipated that bills will be introduced in both the House and the Senate in Fall
of 2019 or sometime in 2020. Indeed, the Supreme Court even appeared to invite
Congress in Mayo to provide guidance, stating that the Court "recognized the role of
Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules where necessary." Many major patent
stakeholders are also encouraging Congress to act; for example, both the Intellectual
Property Owners Association and the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, both large well-regarded professional IP associations, have written to
Congress asking the lawmakers to undo the Mayo/Alice framework through
legislation. 229 This is opportune time for Congress to do so because the time is ripe
and it is necessary. But, what should Congress do regarding patent eligibility?
Professors Lefstin and Menell have proffered a legislative proposal of focusing
23 0
on a "practical application" of an abstract idea, natural law, or natural phenomenon,
with the logic behind this proposal being that this would be aligned with pre-Mayo
jurisprudence. This position also has some backing from the ABA's Section of
Intellectual Property Law, evidenced by their submission of comments to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office that largely agree with this "practical application"
test.2 3' Moreover, Professors Lefstin and Menell, well known patent law scholars,
submitted a supplementary statement, as recent as in Summer of 2019, to the
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearings on "The

obviousness, enablement, written description, and definiteness, any useful invention should be
eligible for protection regardless of whether it is new or old, conventional, known, or using other
terms relevant to determining obviousness or anticipation. 2. When assessing the eligibility of patent
claims, those claims must be construed as a whole, with each limitation in a claim given equal
weight, and none dismissed or discounted as 'routine,' 'known,' 'conventional,' mere 'data
gathering,' mere "post-solution activity," or the like. It is impermissible to carve up a claim into

different parts and assess the eligibility of the parts of a claim separately, rather eligibility must
consider the claimed invention as a whole. 3. Diagnostic and life science technologies should be
eligible for patent protection per se, subject to meeting the other existing statutory requirements, and
should not be considered a law of nature, natural phenomena, or otherwise patent ineligible subject
matter. 4. Any reform to Section 101 should statutorily codify a definition and/or exception(s) to
patent eligibility. Any statutory exception(s) should not use the existing judicial exceptions of
abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena. Any statutory exceptions should be the sole
and exclusive basis for excluding subject matter from eligibility and may not be expanded upon by
courts. Any definition of eligible subject matter should be adaptive to include new technologies not
yet invented.").
229 Dennis Crouch, AIPLA On Board with Statutory Reform of 101 (May 16, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutory-reform.html.
230 See Brief for Sequenom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom,

Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 15-1182 2016 WL 1605520 (U.S.), pp. 2, 15-16, 24.
231 See Donna P. Suchy, Re: Supplemental Comments Related to Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,

attachment),
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2017)
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2
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RT2%2Comments% 0ABA-

available

at

IPL%20%28Mar.%2028%20Rev%29.pdf. The ABA submitted a formal reform proposal in May
2017.
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State of Patent Eligibility in America." 2 3 2
Yet, from a pure practical standpoint, especially one that patent examiners can
easily apply when examining patent applications in the trenches with little time and
many Office Actions to write, the "practical application," test is a very reasonable
approach, yet may be difficult to universally implement. Indeed, to have some 10,000
patent examiners and over 200 Administrative Patent Judges at the USPTO trained to
then effectively examine based on what would remain a convoluted legal framework
when the vast majority of examiners are not even attorneys, and to do this
examination consistently in a technology-neutral way, may be too ambitious.
Other proposals, including one from David Kappos, the Director of the US
Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) from 2009 to 2013, have invited Congress to
repeal the entire 35 U.S.C. §101 statute from the Patent Act on the basis that it is
unworkable and is outdated since it has virtually remained unchained since the 18th
century. And although the Intellectual Property Owners Association's position may
have evolved, they adopted a resolution recently to support legislation to amend the
statute by adding two subsections. In their statement, they indicated that the
"proposed legislative language would address patent-eligibility concerns by reversing
the Supreme Court decisions and restoring the scope of subject matter eligibility to
that intended by Congress ... ; defining the scope of subject matter eligibility more
clearly and in a technology-neutral manner; ... ; and simplifying the ... eligibility
analysis." 233

I respectfully proffer yet another option, and one I rank highly on available
options, and that is to encourage the lawmakers to look at Europe or even Japan, both
equally industrialized nations with developed legal frameworks, and analyze their
patent laws as a model framework on this patent eligibility issue.
For example, Paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the European Patent Convention
states: 234

(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are susceptible of industrial application.
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as
inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
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(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
(d) presentations of information.
(3) Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subjectmatter or activities referred to therein only to the extent to which a
European patent application or European patent relates to such
subject-matter or activities as such.
Under this framework, the European Patent Office determines the patentability
based on a pair of hurdles: an eligibility hurdle (Article 52 EPC), which requires the
claimed subject matter to have a technical character; and a patentability hurdle
(Articles 54, 56 EPC), which requires the claimed subject matter to contribute a
technical solution to a technical problem. Thus, any legislative fixes to current U.S.
patent eligibility laws, could model itself to be a "threshold," like Article 52 of the
European Patent Convention, and thereby list subject matter that doesn't possess
technical character, such as mathematical methods, methods for performing mental
acts or doing business, and presentations of information.
This may be an easier approach to implement in practice, especially at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office with its approximately 10,000 patent examiners. Indeed,
it appears that as of Fall 2019, a bipartisan framework for 35 U.S.C. § 101 reform is
under consideration by a number of Senators and House Representatives, and one of
their goals is indeed to name a short exclusive list of categories, much like in Europe.
Under consideration are to list and thereby explicitly exclude mental activities, pure
mathematical formulas, products that exist solely and exclusively in nature,
fundamental scientific principles and economic principles.
It remains up for discussion what the final bills will say and how lawmakers will
attempt to remedy the current status of affairs. One thing remains obvious, 35 U.S.C.
§101 cannot remain as is because America's leadership position on innovation and
entrepreneurial new technology development and commercialization is at stake.
Congress's light fix would be to effectively set aside the Mayo decision; a proper
fix would be to effectively set aside the three back-to-back Supreme Court decisions
on patent eligibility, namely Mayo (2012), Myriad (2013) and Alice (2014), and
thereby abolish, in toto, the Supreme Court created exceptions to the statutory
language and intent governing patent eligible subject matter found in 35 U.S.C.

§101.235
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VII. Conclusion
The Patent Act, as noted above, defines four independent categories of subject
matter that are eligible for patent protection: 1) processes; 2) machines; 3)
manufactures; and 4) compositions of matter. 23 6 While it is clear from the Statute that
Congress intended to give a wide scope to patent eligible subject matter, from these
four broad categories that are listed in the statute, the Supreme Court has judicially
created three exceptions of subject matter that the Court considers are ineligible for
patent protection: 1) laws of nature; 2) products of nature; and 3) abstract ideas. Thus,
under current law, a claimed invention is only patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101
if it is a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, and also if it falls
outside the three Supreme Court promulgated judicial exceptions.
For all the reasons outlined supra, this paper advances the proposition that
American society stands to benefit from abolishing the non-statutory, Supreme Court
promulgated, exceptions to U.S. Code Section 101 altogether. These Supreme Court
created exceptions to the statutory language have no foundation and have caused great
uncertainty in patent laws. This has negatively affected certain technology-focused
industries and otherwise damaged America's standing as a leader in new technology
development and commercialization. As outlined supra, the time is ripe for Congress
to act to correct the patent eligibility legal landscape and thereby promote innovation;
to do so, they have good options at hand.
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